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GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE AS JUDICIAL
ANOMALY: BETWEEN "THE TRULY
NATIONAL AND THE TRULY LOCAL"
DEBORAH M. WEISSMAN *
Abstract: In United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court struck down
the federal civil rights remedy for gender-based violence in the Violence
Against Women Act. Notwithstanding evidence considered by Congress
documenting the economic impact of domestic violence, and despite
the inability of state and local systems to address gender-based violence
claims, the Court determined that Congress lacked the necessary
authority. The author argues that Morrison is remarkable in what it
reveals about the legal status of women as mediated in multiple levels of
judicial transactions. She contends that the decision reflects attitudes
ingrained in the nation's judicial culture. Specifically, the doctrines
used by the Court to oppose adjudicating cases of violence against
women are themselves derived from, and analogous to, the arguments
used by state courts to avoid hearing such claims. The Article explores
the day-to-day practices by which state courts adjudicate domestic
violence cases and outlines the need for new legal strategies to address
gender-based violence.
INTRODUCTION
On May 15, 2000, in United States v. Manison, 1 the United States
Supreme Court, by a five to four vote, struck down as unconstitutional
the federal civil rights remedy for gender-based violence contained in
the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).2 VAWA was enacted in 1994
after four years of lengthy congressional hearings.3 More than one
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Programs, the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges Louis
Bilionis, Caroline Brown, Maxine Richner, Louis Perez, Jr., and Beth Posner for their sup-
port and insightful comments and suggestions. Brooke Williams and William Keyser pro-
vided excellent research assistance.
1 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
t Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 20, 28, and 42 U.S.C.) thereinafter VAWA or the
Act]. The Civil Rights Remedy of the Act is found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13981-14040 (1994).
5 See generally Domestic Violence: Not Just a Family Matter: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime and CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on theJudiciaPy, 103d Cong. (1994) [hereinafter
1081
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hundred witnesses testified, and hundreds of reports and statements
documenting the problem of gender-based violence were submitted.
Committees of both houses of Congress scrutinized the failure of state
legal structures to prOvide relief to victims, and the tragic conse-
quences of that failure. 4 The federal statute, supported by most states,
was historic because it authorized victims of gender-based violence to
bring civil rights actions against their attackers in federal courts, 5
Congress based its authority to establish the civil rights remedy
on its Cotnmerce Clause powers and on Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.6 In enacting VAWA, Congress determined that violence
against women is a national problem that limits women's ability to
participate in the national economy as fully productive citizens.?
VAWA provided a remedy for a "national tragedy played out every day
in the lives of millions of American women at home, in the workplace,
and on the street: 3 Congress recognized that claims of gender-based
violence raised questions of sufficient public concern to warrant a
federal judicial forum "reserved for issues where important national
interests predominate."9
1994 H.R Hrg.]; Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. an the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1993) [hereinafter
1993 H.R. Hrg.]; Violence Against Women: Fighting the Fear: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1993) [hereinafter Nou 1993 S. HT.]; Violent Crimes Against
Women: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1993) [hereinafter Apr:
1993 S. Hrg.]; Hearing an Domestic Violence: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong. (1993) [hereinafter Feb. 1993 S. Hrg.]; Violence Against Women: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1992)
[hereinafter 1992 H.R. Hrg.]; Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1991) [hereinafter 1991 S. Hrg.]; Women and
Violence: Hearings &fore the Senate Comm. an the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1990) [hereinafter
1990 S. HT.]; Domestic Violence: Terrorism in the Home: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Children,
Family, Drugs, and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong.
(1990) [hereinafter 1990 S. Labor Hrg.]. For a useful examination of the history of VAWA,
see generally Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence
Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 Wis. WomEN's L.J. 1 (1996).
4
 See 1994 H.R. Hrg., supra note 3; 1993 HR. Hrg., supra note 3; Nov. 1993 S. Hrg., supra
note 3; Apr: 1993 S. Hrg., supra note 3; Feb. 1993 S. Hrg., supra note 3; 1992 H.R. 1 Irg., supra
note 3; 1991 S. Hrg., supra note 3; 1990 S. Hrg., supra note 3; 1990 S. Labor Hrg., supra note
3.
5 See 1993 HR Hrg., supra note 3.
° H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994) reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839,
1853. See also S. REP. No. 101-545, at 33 (1990).
7 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, supra note 6, at 385. See also S. REP. No. 101-545, supra
note 6, at 33.
8 S. REP. No. 102-197, at 39 (1991).
° This phrase was used by Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court William
Rehnquist in his 1991 "Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary" in which he urged oppo-
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By reconceptualizing the phenomenon of gender-based violence
as a condition disrupting the lives of women in ways public and pro-
found, the legislative findings, and the legislation itself, relocated the
protection of women from local to national forums. Women were
then able to use the new law to obtain immediate pecuniary and in-
junctive relief from damage caused by domestic violence, rape, and
sexual assault." Of far greater significance, however, VAWA promised
to address the larger structural inequalities at the heart of violence
against women by authorizing a remedy that recognized gender-based
violence as a fundamental civil rights issue, for which economic relief
could be provided. 0
Morrison challenged the Act as unconstitutional. Notwithstanding
the vast body of evidence documenting the economic impact of rape
and domestic violence, and despite the documented inability of state
and local systems to address gender-based violence claims, the Su-
sition to the federal jurisdictional provisions of VAWA. Speech reprinted at 138 CONG.
REC. S443-44 (Jan. 27, 1992). See also Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women,
Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1688 (1991).
10 Prior to Morrison, cases which upheld the constitutionality of VAWA included Wil-
liams v. Bd. of County Comm'r of Wyandotte County, No. 98-2485-JTM, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13532, *1, *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 1999); Kuhn v. Kuhn, 98 02395 (N.D. Ill. July 14,
1999); Wright v. Wright, No. Civ-98-572-A (W.D. Okla. Apr. 27, 1999); Ericson v. Syracuse
Univ., 98 Civ. 3935, 1999 WL 212684 *1, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 1999); Culbertson v. Doan,
No. C-1-97-965 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 8, 1999); Doe v. Mercer, 37 F. Stipp. 2d 64, 64 (D. Mass.
1999); Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Stipp. 2d 452, 452 (D. R.I. 1999); Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka,
No. 98-1550.CIV- HIGHSMITH (S.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 1998); C.R.K. v. Martin, No. 96-1431-
MLB (D. Kan. Jul. 10, 1998); Time v. DeLong, No. 8:98C1/43 (D. Neb.fune 22, 1998); Mat-
tison v. Click Corp., No. 97-CV-2736, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 720 *I, *1, 72 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCII) (P. 45,209) (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1998); Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601, 601
(D. Wash. 1998); Crisonino v. New York City Hous. Auth., 985 F. Stipp. 385, 385 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Stipp. 531, 531 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F.
Stipp. 1188, 1188 (D. Tenn. 1997); Doe v. Father Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1375 (N.D. Iowa
1997), rev'd on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608,
608 (D. Conn. 1996). In addition to Brzonkala, Berterva a Berteroa, No. 96-3445-A, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8181 (M.D. La., May 28, 1999), held the Act to be unconstitutional. For a
synopsis of these cases, see littp://www.nowldef.org/hunl/courts/courts.hun (last visited
Jan. 23, 2001).
It Civil remedies allow the victimized woman to act on her own behalf, in contrast with
criminal remedies which are implemented by the state as sovereign authority. See Deborah
Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases; Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors,
Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 20 (1999) (noting that affirmative
relief granted in civil protection orders reduces a battered woman's reliance on the crimi-
nal justice system); Linda G. Mills, On The Other Side of Silence: Affective Lawyering for Intimate
Abuse, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1225, 1252 (1996) (noting that primary reliance on criminal
remedies may inhibit a woman from initiating her own efforts to obtain assistance).
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preme Court determined that Congress lacked the authority to legis-
late such a remedy.I 2
In addition to establishing this civil rights remedy, VAWA author-
ized a number of new programs and created new federal crimes; but
Morrison challenged only the civil rights portion of the Act.I 3 Civil
rights actions not only express paramount public values, they are, by
nature, potentially transformative of public values as well." The de-
mise of VAWA suggests that the judicial system is unable to sustain the
necessary commitment to the normative goal of ameliorating gender-
based violence.
Morrison presents a decision rich with possibilities of doctrinal
analysis from many perspectives. Generally, it is a noteworthy judicial
restriction on the power of Congress to legislate federal civil rights
remedies under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The decision establishes significant federal juris-
prudential principles sure to be the subject of wide-ranging analyses.
But to those attentive to issues concerning violence against
women, the Morrison decision is particularly remarkable in what it re-
veals about the legal status of women as mediated in multiple levels of
judicial transactions. The decision gave narrative order to the hierar-
chy of legal values within which women have been "put in their
place." The high court judged gender-based violence claims to be of
marginal importance to the national interest.
If this view were confined only to the Supreme Court, the prob-
lem would be grave, but not without solution. In fact, however, Morri-
son reflects attitudes deeply ingrained in the judicial culture of the
nation. Although framed in terms of federal jurisdictional principles,
the doctrines which the Court used to oppose and avoid adjudicating
cases of violence against women are themselves derived from, and
analogous to, the very arguments used by state courts to avoid hearing
gender-based violence claims.
12 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
13 Chief justice Rehnquist had previously stated his opposition to both VAWA's crimi-
nal and civil rights provisions. See supra note 9. Eventually, the Chief Justice ceased his
criticisms of the criminal remedy and limited his ongoing opposition to the civil remedies
provided by the Act. See Nourse, supra note 3 at 16. The criminal remedy is codified at 18
U.S.C. § 2261(a) (1) and was on surer footing than the civil rights remedy because it con-
tained a jurisdictional element. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
14 See Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice
in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 869 (1997) (noting that civil rights laws
have potentially transformative value, particularly for disempowered groups).
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The reasons given in Morrison mirror state responses to requests
for civil remedies in the form of civil protection orders, 15 beginning
with the Court's decision to side-step the evidence concerning the
structural nature of gender-based violence. 16 State courts, too, often
dismiss evidence that contextualizes domestic violence and addresses
its social characteristics. 17 The symmetry stands in even sharper relief
through a comparison of the Court's invocation of federalism as rea-
son to avoid gender-based violence claims with its counterpart in state
court explanations for avoiding the issuance of civil protection or-
ders.'8
In striking down a federal claim for gender-based violence, the
Morrison Court declared that "the Constitution requires a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local,"19 This pro-
nouncement served to divest violence against women of its systemic
character, and belies a common view that claims of gender-based vio-
lence are more anecdotal than structural, more idiosyncratic than in-
stitutional.
The reluctance to hear gender-based violence cases often leads
the courts to adopt procedures that have as effect, if not intent, the
dilution of the legal merits of claims. State court efforts to abbreviate
the fact-finding process and to encourage out-of-court resolutions
contribute to the perception that the legal issues raised in these
claims are not worthy of the court's attention." Claims of congested
state court dockets currently constitute one of several justifications for
the summary treatment of civil domestic violence cases. 21 Just as the
Supreme Court in Morrison avoided federal review by confining claims
to the state, the state courts shun these cases by curtailing the hearing
process, thereby reducing them to quasi-judicial controversies, or con-
signing them outside of the legal system altogether. 22
15 In state court, civil remedies are often sought in domestic violence protection order
proceedings. For an excellent overview of civil protection order remedies, see generally
Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analy-
sis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801 (1993).
16 See infra notes 124-131 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 230-236 and accompanying text.
Is See infra Parts I and II,
15 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 599.
" See infra notes 178-186, 196-201 and accompanying text.
51 See infra notes 158, 161 and accompanying text.
22
 See Naomi R. Calm, Family Law, Federalism and the Federal Courts, 79 lowA L. REV,
11073, 1105 (1994) (noting that the federalism rhetoric has the effect of confining women's
issues to the private sphere).
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The Morrison decision thus relegated women to the very system
that Congress determined was incapable of providing meaningful re-
lief. The decision therefore invites an examination of the theoretical,
as well as the practical, aspects of the judicial and legal culture in
which the issue of gender-based violence appears unable to obtain
sympathetic attention. The Morrison decision represents a setback at a
moment when other means to combat violence against women seem
"ever more elusive and uncertain."23
 The question thus looms, under
the circumstances, what alternative remedies are available?
This Article moves within the tense and contradictory space be-
tween the failures and promises of the law. Decades of legal scholar-
ship have contributed to a deeper understanding of the nature of vio-
lence against women. The Morrison decision makes clear the need for
additional work. The defeat of VAWA reveals the relentlessness with
which the courts may act to categorize gender-based violence as an
issue of marginal importance. 24
This condition requires an analysis of the normative system
from which the legal culture derives its bearings. The discussion
must move beyond simply criticizing the law for its self-evident
failure to live up to its ideals. More importantly, the discussion
must address the sources of these failures by examining the pro-
cesses which create inequalities and allow them to pass into le-
gal sensibility as conventional wisdom. 25
 The empirical data
gathered during the VAWA hearings, including the substantia-
tion of the failure of state systems, provide a useful point of de-
parture for reexamining the state civil protection order process.
The demise of VAWA and the Morrison decision underscore the
need to contest these mechanisms and continue the pursuit of legal
reforms for battered women. New approaches must move beyond a
critique of the inadequacies of the law and contemplate legal strate-
gies at the micro-level in order to enhance progressive lawyering in
. 23 See Mills, supra note 11, at 1249 (citing Jane Flax, Beyond Equality: Gender, Justice and
Difference, in BEYOND EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE 193, 195 (Gisela Bock & Susan James eds.,
1992)).
24 See Sally Engle Merry, Lau; Culture, and Cultural Appropriation, 10 YALE J.L. Sc Hu-
MAN. 575, 577 (1998) (noting that the analysis of legal systems requires an understanding
of the categories of meaning which define participants' experiences).
25 See JOHN CONLEY Sc WILLIAM M. UBARRJUST WORDS 13 (1998) (demonstrating the
need to expose the mechanisms that produce inequalities in the legal process).
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gender-based violence matters.26 The perspectives of everyone en-
gaged in this effort, including theorists, practitioners, and litigants,
are needed to transform the legal culture as it relates to violence
against women.
Part I provides an overview of VAWA's significance as a product of
legislative processes in which gender-based violence was examined as
a national problem with economic and civil rights implications. It ad-
dresses the attitudes that necessitated legislative compromises, causing
VAWA proponents' ultimate failure to transform the problem of vio-
lence against women from an issue of the private realm to a matter of
public concern.27 This section concludes with an examination of the
Morrison decision, and evaluates how the Supreme Court recatego-
rized VAWA's legislative evidence in order to return gender-based vio-
lence claims to the state courts.
Part II explores the day-to-day practices by which state courts ad-
judicate domestic violence cases.28 By examining the operation of the
law, and the legal culture, in the context of civil protection order
hearings, this section seeks to explore the ways that the law's malfunc-
tion in state courts perpetuates itself within the legal system and in-
sinuates itself in other forums. Part II also considers the consequences
of the law's failures, ranging from the denial to women of the right to
confront the violence, to outcomes that devalue their claims and en-
danger their persons. An examination of these issues at the state level
tests the theories of localism that influence Morrison's legal treatment
of gender-based violence.29
Part III outlines the need for new legal strategies to address gen-
der-based violence. Legal practitioners must respond to the chal-
lenges posed by the resilience with which the law has underwritten
2'3 Cf. Margaret M. Russell, De Pure Revolution?, 93 Mimi. L. REV. 1173, 1194 (1995)
(suggesting that critical theoretical insights about the law be combined with the demands
of legal practice to affect micro-level decisions of client representation).
27 SeeJudith Resnik, Trial as Erns; Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Arti-
cle III, 113 HARV. L. REv. 924, 968 (2000) (examining legal cultural determinants by which
a hierarchy of values is expressed, and noting that some cases are considered Important"
matters, to be contrasted with "ordinary," "routine," "run of the mill," or "garden variety"
cases).
28 See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Question of Process, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1387, 1391
(2000) (noting that how a decision is reached may be as important as the decision itself).
29 See Libby S. Adler, Federalism and Family, 8 CoLum. J. GENDER & L. 197, 205 (1999)
(reviewing a theory of localism that suggests that state courts are better suited to respond
to legal issues that arise within families). Adler notes the difficulty in differentiating be-
tween violence against women and family law issues that pulls the former into the sphere
of theories of localism. Id. at 253.
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the social and political status quo." This section urges the use of
specific legal strategies as mechanisms for elevating gender-based vio-
lence issues as legal claims. This part also continues the work of other
domestic violence scholars and practitioners who have articulated the
need to develop litigation strategies that inform the courts about the
nature of domestic violence, reveal the relationship between power
and the social function of violence, and demonstrate the ways in
which domestic violence has fully assumed the dimensions of a public
problem. Part III moves to micro-level proposals, derived from the
previous discussions, for obtaining practical relief for battered
women.
I. THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT AND UNITED STATES V.
MORRISON
A. The Violence Against Women Act—An Overview
In September 1994 Congress passed the Violence Against Women
Act, a historic legislative enactment which recognized the nexus be-
tween gender-based violence and women's equality, and addressed the
persistent failure of the states' legal systems to provide adequate legal
redress to victims. 31
 VAWA incorporated measures designed to re-
spond to the wide-ranging consequences of domestic violence: It
funded a variety of programs, including women's shelters," a national
domestic abuse hotline, 33
 rape education and prevention programs, 34
and training for federal and state judges. 35
In addition to funding services and improving existing legal re-
sponses to domestic violence, the Act expanded legal remedies for
gender-based violence. It created new relief measures designed for
immigrants whose abusive spouses obstructed access to lawful status in
the United States." It criminalized the crossing of state lines for the
purpose of "harassing, intimidating, or injuring a spouse or intimate
"SeeYamamato, supra note 14, at 846-47 (summarizing progressive race scholars' view
that the law serves to protect and maintain social and political status quo).
" Supra note 2.
" 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1994).
"42 U.S.C. § 10461(e) (2) (E) (1995).
" 42 U.S.C. § 10418 (1994).
" Id. §§ 13701, 13991, 13992, 14036.
3€ Id. § 14051, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (1994). (Remedies are generally limited to immi-
grant spouses of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, and in some circumstances,
immigrants who have children with abusive U.S. citizens).
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partner?" and provided for interstate enforcement of orders of pro-
tection." The Act's most controversial provision created a federal civil
rights remedy "to protect the civil rights of victims of gender-
motivated violence and to promote public safety, health, and activities
affecting interstate commerce?"
The Act had an extensive legislative history. 4° For more than four
years, Congress assembled a voluminous record of oral testimony and
written documentation about the problem of gender-based violence.
Over one hundred witnesses testified during the course of at least
nine hearings. Experts provided research findings and evidence
documenting the consequences of violence against women. In public
testimony, victims of violence detailed their horrific experiences. Wit-
nesses included battered women, rape victims, shelter and rape crisis
program advocates, law enforcement officials, lawyers with expertise
in domestic violence, state attorneys general, judges, legal and other
academic scholars, social scientists, and physicians.° Documentation
of the extensive nature and consequences of gender-based violence
was introduced from businesses and professional associations, judicial
organizations, medical groups, feminist research centers, and other
women's groups.°
Throughout the four years of hearings, Congress focused princi-
pally on two concerns: the impact of violence against women on the
interstate economy, and inadequate responses by states resulting in
the denial of equal protection of the laws to victims of gender-based
violence.° The findings in these areas were the underpinnings of leg-
islation which assigned to the federal courts issues that were histori-
cally considered off-limits to the federal judiciary."
37 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2262 (1994).
" Id. § 2265.
39 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994). The remedy specified that a person who commits a
"crime of violence motivated by gender" shall be liable to the individual injured for com-
pensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and other relief a court
may deem appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994).
4° See supra note 3.
41 See supra note 3.
45 See 1991 S. Hrg., supra note 3; S. REP. No. 101-545, supra note 6, at 37.
43 Congress examined the problem of violence against women generally and exhaus-
tively, but the greater part of the debate and hearings was devoted to these issues. See Julie
Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against
Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 109,
112-13 (2000). See generally Nourse, supra note 3, passim (detailing the legislative history of
the Act).
" H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, supra note 6, at 385; accord, S. REP. No. 103-138, at
54. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, supra note 6, at 385-86; S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38,
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The hearings confirmed that victims of gender-based violence are
inhibited from engaging in interstate travel and pursuing interstate
employment or businesses,* that they are denied employment oppor-
tunities due to the danger of gender-based assaults at certain times of
the day or at particular locations,* that their productivity in the
workplace is reduced, and that, as a result, they are unemployed and
under-employed.47 Violence against women was found to limit the
right to travel, diminish national productivity, reduce consumer
spending, and increase medical and other health care expenditures."
Testimony demonstrated that the actions of perpetrators were delib-
erately targeted towards preventing women from engaging in any
economic endeavors.*
Testimony and documentation received by Congress chronicled
women's experiences of gender-based violence. The narratives pre-
sented to Congress illustrated the ways in which gender-based vio-
lence interferes with a victim's ability to discharge everyday functions.
Testimony, often in the first person, provided accounts of brutal and
terrorizing assaults, and powerfully documented how the experience
of rape and violence interrupts jobs and careers, interferes with per-
sonal movement in public spaces, and looms as ongoing trauma un-
likely to subside with the passage of tinrie.5°
41-55; S. REP. No. 102-197, supra note 8, at 33-35, 41, 43-47; Resnik, supra note 27, at
1004-06 (noting that the federal judiciary has attempted to limit violence against women
claims to the state courts); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2202 (1996) (noting that VAWA's remedies were considered to
target concerns historically treated as being appropriately relegated to the states).
45 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CA.N. 1839,
1853; S. REP. No. 103-38, supra note 44, at 54; accord S. REP. No. 102-97, supra note 8, at
53; S. REP. 101-545, supra note 6, at 43.
46
 See 1991 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at 92 (testimony of Prof. Bert Neuborne).
47 S. REP. No. 101-545, supra note 6, at 37; 1991 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at 241; 1994 H.R.
Hrg., supra note 3; Feb. 1993 S. Rep., supra note 3.	 •
46
 S. REP. No. 103-38, at 41 (1993); H.R. REP. No. 103495, at 26; 1990 S. Hrg., supra
note 3, at Pt. 1.
46 1991 S. Hts., supra note 3, at 242 (study showed one-third of battered women re-
ported that their abusers prevented them from working). See 1994 H.R. Hrg., supra note 3
(testimony of Karla Digirolamo whose husband kept her at home); Apr. 1993 S. Hrg., supra
note 3, at 55, 57-58 (testimony of Barbara Wood, Executive Director, Turning Point, de-
scribing a husband who stalked wife at work, during breaks and during lunchtime).
5° 1990 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at Pt. 1, 22-23 (testimony of Nancy Ziegenmeyer). One
young woman testified about her experiences in the aftermath of a rape, detailing how she
lost her job and was forced to drop out of school, resulting in the loss of funding for her
college education. Rape had deprived her of the simple pleasure of taking walks alone.
1991 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at 13143 (testimony of Amy Kaylor). The accounts revealed the
horror brought on by domestic violence. One mother told of finding her daughter dead
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Evidence from employers supported victim testimony and dem-
onstrated that gender-based violence is inexorably connected to
women's economic equality and autonomy. 51
 Business associations
detailed the negative impact of violence on both employers and em-
ployees.52 Business interests also enumerated the ways in which they
are adversely affected by the consequences of gender-based violence,
including increased employee health problems, absenteeism, rising
medical costs, and disruption at the workplace as a result of deliberate
interference by abusers with victims' ability to function on the job."
Employers reported that women who are insecure in their homes or
in public places, and who experience the psychological impact of
gender-based violence, suffer significant curtailment of their em-
ployment options. 54 In sum, the far-reaching economic nature and
consequences of gender-based violence convinced Congress that
there was sufficient justification, and Constitutional authority, to pur-
sue a federal remedy under the Commerce Clause. 55
Congressional examination also focused on state criminal and
civil justice systems, exposing the difficulties endured by women seek-
ing protection and remedies from state courts.56 An "existing bias and
discrimination in the state justice system," Congress concluded, "often
deprives victims of genderN motivated crimes the equal protection
and redress of the laws to which they [are] entitled."57 Formal legal
and essentially unrecognizable after having been shot in the head by her abusive former
boyfriend, after unsuccessful requests for the police and the courts to intervene. She de-
scribed the overwhelming stress, insomnia, and terror she suffers in the aftermath of that
tragedy. Violence Against Women, Hearing Before A Subcomm. of the Senate Appropriations Comm.,
104th Congress, First Session, Special Hearing, Sept. 1995 at 13-15 (testimony of Donna
Lawson). The very experience of victimhood was characterized by one witness as the rele-
gation to an unfamiliar status in which she was viewed as the architect of flied own suffer-
ing," deprived of her identity as an autonomous individual with goals and aspirations or
the ability to survive. 1990 S. Hrg., supra note 3, Pt. 1, at 30 (testimony of Marla Hanson).
51 1991 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at 237-41. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family
Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475,495 (1999) (noting that feminists' efforts to curb family violence
relate to their concerns about equality and individual autonomy for women).
52 1991 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at 237 (evidence provided by the National Federation of
Business and Professional Women, Inc., an organization whose goals are "advancing the
economic equity, self-sufficiency, and full participation in the work force for all working
women").
53 1991 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at 239-40 (noting increased employer costs related to
medical expenses).
54 See id. at 240-41.
ss H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, supra note 6, at 385; see also S. REP. No. 103-138, at 29
(1994).
55 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, supra note 6, at 385.
67 Id.
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barriers as well as informal judicial practices, moreover, were found to
have engendered systemic discrimination against victims of gender
violence.
Witnesses testified about psychological distress endured during
trials of their assailants: One woman described the experience as "far
more traumatizing than the attack on the street" in which her face was
repeatedly slashed.58 Testimony also revealed racist and degrading
treatment by law enforcement, 59 while anecdotal evidence and news-
paper articles reported indecorous behavior on the part of judges,
prosecutors, and law enforcement officers. 6°
Congress examined gender bias reports, previously commis-
sioned by the highest courts of the states, which provided "overwhelm-
ing evidence that gender bias permeates the court system and that
women are most often its victims."81 In the words of the Senate report,
women are treated as though their complaints of domestic violence
" One witness who was the victim of a brutal assault described the criminal proceed-
ings against her assailants: The judge refused to restrain a defense attorney's baseless ef-
forts to humiliate her by referring to her as, among other things, a prostitute. 1990 S. Hrg.,
supra note 3, Pt. 1, at 42 (testimony of Marla Hanson). See also 1991 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at
135 (testimony of Gill Freeman, Chair of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study
Implementation Commission, formerly Vice Chair of the Florida Supreme Court Gender
Bias Study) (noting that "rape remains a crime in which the victim is often as traumatized
by the system as they are by the assailants themselves").
" One Latina witness recounted her experiences with the police, who told her that she
should not file a report against her abuser since abuse was part of her culture. 1993 S.
Hrg., supra note 3, at 12 (testimony of Loretta Baca); 1991 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at 136 (tes-
timony of Gill Freeman) (testifying to the widespread abusive practices of judges and law
enforcement officers who act on the belief that women who are raped bring about the
sexual assault). Ms. Freeman's testimony also detailed the acquittal of a rapist because the
victim was wearing a lace miniskirt and therefore was thought to have invited the rape, and
detailed a judge's refusal to sentence a confessed rapist to jail because he felt sorry for him
being involved with such a pathetic woman, whom he recalled from a divorce case he had
handled several years ago. Id. at 136. She recounted a judge interrupting a prosecutor in
the presentation of a rape case of a college student who was attacked at 11:30 p.m. while
she was at the mailbox sending a letter to her mother, asking "What in the world was the
woman doing in the streets late at night?" Ms. Freeman also described coercive investiga-
tions of victims of sexual assault who were forced to take polygraphs and were badgered by
police officers who repeatedly asked, "Were you forced?" Id. at 136-56.
60 1991 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at 136, 146 (testimony of Gill Freeman) (recounting this
comment made by a judge to a rapist during sentencing: "iTJake the woman out to dinner
first, like the rest of us."). One newspaper article reports of a judge who jailed two victims
of sexual assault because they were reluctant to testify against their assailants. One of the
victims, initially sentenced to 60 days without bail, described her fear of going forward with
the prosecution, noting that the presence of the assailant and his family intimidated her.
Christina Cheakalos, Broward Judge Jailed Second Sex Crime Victim, MIAMI HERALD, July 31,
1999, at 1A.
91 1991 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at 43-44.
2001]	 Gender-based Violence as Judicial Anotnoly	 1093
are "trivial, exaggerated or somehow their own fault." 62 Neither state
nor federal criminal laws were found to provide adequate protection
to victims of gender-based violence." Congress was encouraged by
both state and federal attorneys general to make findings on the in-
adequacy of state and local civil remedies, specific legal obstacles, and
pervasive gender bias within the state court systems.64
Testimony recounting experiences with state justice systems also
revealed the insidious effects of informal but ingrained responses to
gender-based violence. 65 The evidence indicated that, despite state
civil protection order statutes that allow courts to grant broad relief in
domestic violence matters, state courts' lack of interest in these mat-
ters resulted in consistent failure to issue effective protective orders."
Judges testified as to how ati absence of judicial empathy undermined
the actual availability of legal relief authorized by legislatures. 67 Evi-
dence also recounted judicial determination "to keep families to-
gether" as a motivation for granting custody of children to abusers,
thereby forcing women to stay, despite proof of abuse. 68
In the end, the hearings revealed the existence of a legal culture
in state courts infused with the belief that problems of gender-based
violence were inappropriate for judicial resolution. 69 This belief was
made operational by legal procedures and court practices which ig-
62 Id. at 46.
63 1993 H. Hrg., supra note 3, at 96 (testimony of James P. Turner, Acting Assistant U.S.
Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division).
64 1993 H.R. Hrg., supra note 3, at 34-36 (letter from 41 Attorneys General urging
Congress to pass VAWA); 1993 H.R. Hrg., .supra note 3, at 96, 106-07, (testimony of James
P. Turner).
63 One witness, Sarah Buel, a formerly battered woman, who at that time was an attor-
ney with the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau, testified: "What terrifies me is that I don't think
things have changed very much its spite of the fact that we do have laws and shelters." Her
prepared testimony indicated that despite the laws that have been passed, courts were not
providing statutory relief in civil protection orders. 1990 S. Labor Hrg., supra note 3, at 28-
29, 34, 38-39.
66 Civil protection orders omit provisions ordering abusers to vacate premises, order-
ing child support, and making custody provisions. 1990 S. Labor Hrg., supra note 3, at 34,
38-39 (testimony of Sarah Buel). Testimony was also provided which indicated that despite
state statutes prohibiting the issuance of mutual restraining orders, such orders continued
to be an ongoing problem in state court. Feb. 1993 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at 5 (testimony of
Sarah Bud).
67 Apr: 1993 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at 27 (testimony ofJudge Michael R. Murphy).
See id. at 63 (testimony of Patricia Millard).
69 These claims were identified by state courts as "family problems," or "sexual mis-
communication." 1991 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at 37.
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nored statutory protections and marginalized these claims. 70 These
accumulated state failures provided Congress with an additional ra-
tionale for creating VAWA's civil rights remedy. 71
VAWA required four years and at least fourteen versions before its
passage, suggesting the' conflict and contention that marked its legis-
lative course.72
 Alternative bills were introduced in both the Senate
and the House seeking to eliminate the civil rights provisions." The
federal judiciary, led by the Chief Justice of the United States Su-
preme Court, registered' its disapproval from the outset. 74 Remonstra-
tions were focused on the prospect of federal court involvement in "a
whole host of domestic relations disputes"75 and fear that the civil
rights remedies "[would] be invoked as a bargaining tool within the
context of divorce negotiations and add a major complicating factor
to an environment which is often acrimonious as it is." 76 Chief Justice
Rehnquist called the proposed Act "an additional burden on the judi-
ciary" that would overload the court docket??
The language of the bill was ultimately redrafted in response to
concerns that the scope of the remedy could include "routine" acts of
domestic violence and sexual assault. 78
 The new wording narrowed
75
 See 1 991 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at 46 (noting that law reform failed to eradicate
stereotypes in the court); 1991 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at 44 (legal practices continued to
shine a spotlight of suspicion on the victim); 1991 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at 135 (noting
pervasive gender-biased treatment of these matters).
71
 H.R. CONE. REF. No. 103-711, supra note 8, at 385.
72 See Nourse, supra note 3, at 7.
"Id. at 13, 34. In 1991, Senator Dole introduced the Women's Equal Opportunity Act,
which omitted the civil rights provision. Id. at 13. In 1993, Representative Schumer, for
tactical reasons, introduced an alternative bill to the House Subcommittee on Crime and
Criminal Justice which eliminated the civil rights remedy, hoping it would be restored at
the full Committee level; however, no such progress was made in the full committee. Id. at
34.
74
 See Epstein, supra note 11, at 20; Mills, supra note 11, at 1252.
75
 The Chief Justice objected that the Act would federalize domestic relations law and
overburden the courts. See 1993 HA Hrg., supra note 3, at 74-76. Eventually, the Chief
Justice ceased his criticisms of the criminal remedy and limited his ongoing opposition to
the civil remedies provided by the Act. See Nourse, supra note 3, at 16.
76
 1993 H.R. Hrg, supra note 3, at 74-75.
77 See 1993 HR Hrg., supra note 3, at 74-75; Epstein, supra note 11, at 20; Mills, supra
note 11, at 1252.
75
 Victoria Nourse, who was Special Counsel to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
for the 102d (1991-1992) and the 103d (1993-1994) Congresses, recounted the concerns
repeatedly raised as to whether the civil rights remedy "would cover minor or trivial inci-
dents" and "'trivial' matters." Nourse, supra note 3, at 14,17. Supporters were required to
provide ongoing assurance to Congress (and the federal courts) that the Act would not be
unduly burdensome on the federal courts, and that the remedy would not cover "everyday
domestic violence cases." See 1991 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at 69-70. One bill sponsor who
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the definition of "crime of violence" and added language that re-
quired a specific demonstration of gender animus." The Act specified
that in order to pursue a civil rights remedy, a plaintiff would have to
demonstrate that the defendant committed a felony—thus curtailing
the usefulness of the remedy for battered women who suffer repeated
misdemeanor assaults." The Act specifically precluded a federal court
from considering any pendent claims "seeking the establishment of a
divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, or child
custody decree."" The Act also barred the removal to federal court of
any state court action asserting VAWA's civil rights remedy.82
B. The Violence Against Women Act: Significance and Shortcomings
The enactment of VAWA provided useful opportunities for the
articulation of public values. Legislative bodies are often viewed as
incapable of achieving transformative change—even less capable than
courts, which are perceived as independent and less subject to special
interest pressures and to the necessity of compromise." The legisla-
tive history of VAWA reveals a successful departure from traditional
law-making because it rested on a method of discourse posturing as
impersonal, general, and neutral." Throughout the public hearings,
human stories unfolded, in narrative form, which informed members
sought to restrict the scope of the remedy suggested that the act of rape by a man while
telling a woman that he loved her could not and would not give rise to a claim under the
Act. See Siegel, supra note 44, at 2200.
79 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
6° Id. Where assaults or beatings rise only to a level of a misdemeanor, the fact that
they are a part of an ongoing pattern will not save these restrictions, further demonstrat-
ing the limitations of the remedy. See Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights for Battered Women:
Axiomatic and Ignored, 11 LAW & INEQ. 1, 59 (1992) (noting that limiting the civil rights
provision of VAWA to felonies impairs domestic violence victims' ability to bring an ac-
tion).
91 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e) (4) (1994). See also 1993 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at 51 (noting that
the civil rights remedy will not involve the federal judiciary in divorce or domestic relations
matters).
62 28	 § 1445(d) (1994).
" See William N. Eskridge, jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1007, 1016 (1989) (noting that political science scholars describe the legislature as "para-
lyzed and unable to take constructive action" and likely to enact weak laws as a result of
unprincipled compromises and deference to special interests).
84 See Robert P. Aponte Toro, Sanity in International Relations: An Experience in Therapeu-
tic jurisprudence, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 659, 682 n.60 (1999) (citing EFREN RIV-
ERA-RAMOS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN COLONIALISM: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
CONSTITUTIVE FORCE 0'1, Law 34 (1996)) (noting that the principle attributes of legal dis-
course are "its pretenses of impersonality, generality, and neutrality, which provide the
foundation for its claim of formal rationality.").
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of Congress of the realities of gender-based violence, and this method
of story-telling contributed to the accomplishment of a major legal
reform.85
 VAWA witnesses thus avoided a form of truncated discourse,
frequently forced upon victims in court proceedings, which often de-
prives them of their opportunity to convey their reality without being
demeaned or revictimized, or having their accounts disaggregated.86
Personal stories underscored the human costs of gender-based vio-
lence and introduced legislators to the relationship between violence
against women and women's inequality. 87 Public congressional testi-
mony offered in narrative form served to spur legislative changes, and
it continues to resonate as an effective discursive model for revealing
the magnitude of the problems associated with gender-based vio-
lence."
VAWA's legislative process also provided an important public—
and national—forum in which to emphasize the structural nature of
gender-based violence. Throughout the Congressional hearings, ac-
counts of the tactics and strategies used by perpetrators of gender-
based violence paralleled the catalogue of state failures to provide
equal protection of the laws to women. Where these accounts con-
verged, the construction of women as victims of gender-based vio-
lence emerged in sharp relief. These descriptions often transcended
specific incidents of violence and implicated a social and political dy-
namic involving public structures and institutions." The statistics
produced before Senate and House subcommittees demonstrated
that the magnitude of the problem is so great that it eclipses all other
forms of harm to women 9° The prevalence of gender-based violence
85 See supra note 3.
80 See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87
Mimi. L. REV. 2411, 2428 (1988) (arguing that when communicating facts in the context
of the courts, much of the original meaning and impact can be lost).
87 See Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative in Domestic
Violence Reform, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1243, 1291-92 (1993) (noting that providing narra-
tives to judges as well as to lawmakers focuses the decision-makers on human costs and the
human dimension of the problem).
88 See Goldscheid, supra note 43, at 116 (noting that Congress relied on the substantial
testimony about the consequences of domestic violence and sexual assaults in passing
VAWA); see also ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW i I l
(2000) (commenting on the power of narrative and noting that facts are not only re-
counted by narrative but are constituted by it).
e9
	 GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAM-
ILY VIOLENCE 26 (1988). Gordon's premise throughout her path-breaking book is that
family violence is a problem closely linked to societal norms and political conflicts.
90 Some of the statistical data included data on battering (4 million each year, one
every 15 seconds), rape (more than 2000 every week, one every 6 minutes) and victim
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suggests that violence against women is countenanced in social ethics,
legal institutions, and normative behaviors expressed in a range of
relationships both public and private. 91
This is not to suggest that the pain, trauma, and losses associated
with gender-based violence can be erased by an effective state re-
sponse. But throughout the hearings, violence against women was
clearly identified as a confluence of oppressive circumstances, some of
which were manipulated by perpetrators, and others which were de-
termined by institutional patterns and judicial cultural conventions.
This understanding provided the foundation for federal remedies to
address the multiple causes and consequences of gender-based vio-
lence.
VAWA's achievement in passing a federal civil rights remedy also
created possibilities for reforming the deleterious legal culture that
explains much of the courts' treatment of claims of gender-based vio-
lence. By allowing a federal civil rights cause of action, these claims
might be litigated on par with other civil rights matters, in accordance
with just procedures and practices that stand in sharp contrast with
the unjust treatment afforded by state courts that was documented in
the legislative hearings.92 By creating a federal remedy in a federal
forum, the possibility that gender-based violence would be afforded
additional respect and proper treatment was enhanced.
The successes realized by the enactment of VAWA notwithstand-
ing, the Act's potential was limited. Compromises narrowed the scope
of the remedy and belied the opposition that remains a formidable
obstacle to the treatment of violence against women cases as "impor-
tant"—that is—as federal cases.93 VAWA's short-lived civil rights rem-
gender (95% of all domestic violence victims are women). See 1993 H.R Hrg., supra note 3,
at 26; 1993 S. Hig., supra note 3, at 38; 1991 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at 36.
91 "One assault does not make a battered woman; she becomes that because of her so-
cially determined inability to resist or escape: her lack of economic independence, law
enforcement services, and quite likely, self confidence." GORDON, supra note 89, at 285.
Gordon describes domestic violence as being "sanctioned and controlled through culture—
religious belief, law, and, most importantly, the norms of friendship, kinship, and neigh-
borhood groups." Id.
92 See supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
93 The equating of "federal" with "important" means that simply locating certain issues
within the province of the federal judiciary' guarantees their significance. Aggregated con-
cerns affecting a whole nation are considered federal issues; concerns that are distinct and
restricted to a particular place are viewed as local, See Adler, supra note 29, at 203-04 (con-
trasting the significance assigned to matters allocated to federal courts with local issues
excluded from federal jurisdiction, thus considered less profound concerns). When mat-
ters are entrusted to the federal courts, they are deemed significant, in contrast with disag-
gregated and particularized concerns assigned to the localities. See Resnik, supra note 27, at
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edy was an exception to the customary devolution to the state courts
of cases involving violence against women, yet it nonetheless failed to
provide a structural breakthrough on the federalism question with
regard to gender-based violence and women's concerns generally."
Although the VAWA hearings exposed the myth that state courts pos-
sessed greater expertise in handling claims of violence against women,
the premise that state courts nonetheless retained greater expertise in
"routine" acts of domestic violence, sexual assaults, and family law
matters in general remained unchallenged.95
The disclaimers and assurances, and perhaps most importantly,
the assumptions about the impropriety of locating these matters in
the federal courts, loomed large throughout the legislative discus-
sions.96
 Civil rights deprivations were discursively linked to "[mere]
domestic relations disputes."97 Additionally, the invocation of con-
gested court dockets served as an argument against the remedy. 98
Whatever the pretext, these matters had been peremptorily consid-
ered untouchable by, and unworthy of, the federal courts. The federal
judiciary's hostility to the intended location of remedies for gender-
based violence in a federal forum suggests a hierarchical structure of
the law and of values in the legal system, such that gender-based vio-
lence claims are assigned minimal importance as a matter of course 99
969 (noting that federal courts are superior, '`not in the constitutional sense of the Su-
premacy Clause but in the cultural sense of the meaning and import of the work").
94 See generally Adler, supra note 29; Cahn, supra note 22.
" This is ironic in light of the evidence of pervasive gender bias in the state court sys-
tems. See Calm, supra note 22, at 1091-92 (noting and contesting assumptions about the
competency of state courts to handle family law matters); Resnik, supra note 9, at 1755
(referring to the undermining of the "imagined state competence" of state court judges in
family law matters).
98 See supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
97 See Nourse, supra note 3, at 16 n.85.
" For a useful discussion of congested court dockets as pretext, see generally, Deborah
L. Rhode, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice: Too Much Rhetoric, Too Little Reform, 11 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 989, 989 (1998). Rhode examines the rhetoric of excessive litigation and
overcrowded court dockets and challenges claims that seek to demonstrate evidence of
dramatic growth in litigation as "statistical sleights of hand." Id. at 996-97. Senator Joseph
Biden pointedly addressed this issue during the VAWA hearings, stating "I don't know a
whole lot of Federal judges ... that any of us would think are so overburdened with work
that they are bent at the back and their brow is constantly occupied with beads of sweat."
1992 H.R. Hrg., supra note 3, at 11 (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden).
" See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morri-
son, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135, 173 (2000) (arguing that the invocation of principles of feder-
alism provides cover for maintaining social arrangements of male power). See Cahn, supra
note 22, at 1097 (noting that federalism is invoked to screen federal courts from having to
hear these cases); Resnik, supra note 27, at 1004 (noting that family matters are considered
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Legislative process is marked by discussions and debates in which
the social and legal soundness of any proposed law is tested. But op-
position to VAWA emerged through a rhetorical pattern insinuating
issues of gender and hierarchy, revealing a persistent resistance to the
transformation of domestic violence from a "mere" family dispute
into a civil rights violation of national import. This pattern may be
seen as re-emerging in the Supreme Court's decision that struck down
the Act, albeit altered and cloaked within concerns for a proper divi-
sion between state and national power.
C. Christy Brzonkala and United States v. Morrison
In September 1994, as VAWA passed into law, Christy Brzonkala
alleged that she was assaulted and repeatedly raped by two men (An-
tonio Morrison and James Crawford) shortly after enrolling as a
freshman at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute. 100 She filed a com-
plaint with Virginia Tech, a state-funded university."' Morrison admit-
ted to having sexual relations with Brzonkala against her will and was
sentenced to a two-semester suspension."' After a process of appeals
and rehearings, in part due to Virginia Tech's mishandling of the
complaint,105 Morrison's punishment was set aside as excessive. 104
Brzonkala suffered trauma as a consequence of the rape, dropped out
of school, and required psychiatric counseling."5 Virginia Tech,
charged with providing redress and remedy, had neglected to com-
municate a policy against gender-based violence: In the case of Christy
Brzonkala, the school declined to sanction it. 106
In December 1995, Brzonkala filed suit in federal court under
VAWA's civil rights provision. The District Court dismissed the action,
holding that Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce
"intrinsically" state court matters); Siegel, supra note 44, at 2197 (pointing out the chang-
ing rules and rhetoric invoked for the purpose of avoiding a federal cause of action for
gender-based violence claims). Cf. B. Glenn George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Har-
assment Claims, 73 B.U. L. REv. 1, 2 (1993) (noting that sexual harassment claims are con-
sidered to be of questionable status).
100 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,602-04 (2000).
t° 1 Id. at 603.
162 Id.
103 Id. Virginia Tech allegedly made an error in bringing a complaint against the
school's sexual assault policy which had not been widely distributed to all students.
1° 4 Id.
1" Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602-03. See also Brief Of Petitioner Christy Brzonkala at 4,
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), available at 1999 WL 1034453.
100 Brief Of Petitioner Christy Brzonkala at 5, Morrison, available at 1999 WL 1034453.
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Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted
the civil rights portion of the Act. 107
 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Brzonkala had both stated a
claim under the Act and that the Act was constitutional. 108
 An en bane
court vacated the panel decision and agreed with the district court
judge that the Act was unconstitutional:109
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and the United States
intervened to defend the Act's constitutionality. On May 15, 2000, de-
claring that the Constitution requires a distinction between what is
truly national and what is truly local," the Court struck down VAWA's
civil rights provisions as unconstitutional. 11° Before the Court's deci-
sion, the Act had been upheld as constitutional, and used successfully
by women across the country to obtain damages for injuries they suf-
fered in domestic violence assaults, rapes, and other sexual assaults. 111
Forty-one state attorneys general filed as amici supporting the consti-
tutionality of VAWA and emphasized the need for federal leadership
on the issue of violence against women. 112
In a five-to-four decision, the Court rejected both the Commerce
Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as proper consti-
tutional bases for the Act. 113
 The Court considered separately the two
themes of the legislative findings regarding the economic effect of
gender-based violence and the states' failure to provide relief to vic-
tims—the first in connection with the Commerce Clause and the sec-
ond as it related to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. As to the
Commerce Clause argument, the Court characterized gender-based
violence as non-economic and non-commercial activity, and thus
avoided consideration of its aggregate economic effects. 114 The Court
expressed concern that without judicially enforced limits on Congres-
sional power under the Commerce Clause, virtually any activity could
be construed as having an economic impact in the aggregate, result-
I" Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp 772, 772 (W.D. Va.
1996).
100
 Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 949 (4th Cir. 1997).
105 Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 820 (4th Cir. 1999).
110 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
m See S. REP. No. 102-197, supra note 8, at 39.
112
 1993 H. Hrg., supra note 3, at 34-36 (Attorneys' General Letter). See Goldscheid su-
pra note 43, at 119, 120 (including 38 states, the District of Columbia, and two U.S. territo-
ries).
I" Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
114 Id. at 609-13.
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ing in the obliteration of the division of state and national power."5 In
reaching its conclusions regarding the extent of the commerce power,
the Court relied on United States v. Lopez," 6 in which the Court struck
down a federal criminal statute enacted pursuant to the Commerce
Clause, finding it to be unrelated to commerce)" The Court criti-
cized a "method of reasoning," which it described as a "but-for causal
chain from the initial occurrence of violent crime (the suppression of
which has always been the prime object of the States' police power) to
every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce," as insufficient for
providing justification for Commerce Clause authority. 118
The Court also rejected Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
as a basis of support, holding that VAWA's civil rights remedy was not
fashioned to counteract and redress unequal state laws or proceed-
ings, but, rather, was targeted at private conduct." 9 The Court ac-
knowledged that the legislative record supported congressional
findings that state. judicial systems were flawed and, by design, nonre-
sponsive to women's claims of violence)" But by characterizing the
statute as corrective relief directed at the actions of private individu-
als, and not towards state actors, the Court came to the conclusion
that VAWA lacked a "congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end. "1Y1
D. Underlying Morrison
The legal issues raised in Morrison were constructed first during
the debates on VAWA, and then following the passage of the Act. The
decision since has been reviewed and analyzed from a number of dif-
ferent perspectives. 122 To those concerned with relocating domestic
118 Id. at 615.
118 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995).
117 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609-16. Lopez struck down the federal Gun Free School Zone
Act (GFSZA), which made it a federal crime to possess a gun within a certain distance of a
school. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
118 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
119 Id,
120 Id. at 619.
121 Id, at 626.
12-8 Much of the legal and scholarly analysis supporting the constitutionality of the Act
was made a part of the legislative history. See 1991 S. Hrg., supra note 3, at 83-105 (testi-
mony of Professors Burt Neuborne and Cass Sunstein). Like many significant issues wait-
ing to be resolved by the Supreme Court, Commerce Clause and Section 5 issues were
closely examined before the Court's opinion was issued and since the Act. Several articles
were written which foreshadowed most, if not all of the Court's opinion. See, e.g., William
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violence claims to a national forum, earlier resistance to categorizing
these claims as civil rights violations and the federal judiciary's dis-
comfort with the prospect of adjudicating them in federal courts ap-
pears to underlie the Court's rejection of the Act. 123 A fair reading of
the decision suggests that the Court manipulated traditional (and
gender-neutral) paradigms of economic vs. non-economic activity,
state power vs. national power, and state action vs. private action in
support of its Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment inter-
pretations that denied VAWA's achievement.
I. Commerce Clause Issues
The majority restored the understanding of gender-based vio-
lence as a non-economic and private matter inappropriate for federal
courts by quieting the legislative evidence. The Court avoided a re-
view of the nature and dimensions of the legislative findings in its de-
cision by the undifferentiating application of Lopez and, at best, a cur-
sory application of the law to the legislative facts. 124 No mention was
made of VAWA's legislative evidence demonstrating not only that the
syndrome of gender-based violence impacts the economy, but that the
violent acts themselves are often specifically economic in purpose and
G. Unger, The Federalization of Domestic Violence: An Exercise in Cooperative Federalism or a
Misallocation of Federal Judicial Resources?, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1139, 1139 (1996); Senator
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Defense, 37
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1 (2000); Brenneke, supra note 80, at 1; David M. Fine, The Violence
Against Women Act of 1994: The Proper Federal Role in Policing Domestic Violence, 84 ComELL L.
REV. 252, 252 (1998); Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy,
61 Oin0 Sr. L.J. 1, 1 (2000); Sarah B. Lawsky, A Nineteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence
Against Women Act, 109 YALE U. 783, 783 (2000); Nourse, supra note 3, at 1; Lawrence G.
Sager, A Letter to the Supreme Court Regarding the Missing Argument in Brzonkala v. Morrison, 75
N.Y.U. L REV. 150, 150 (2000); Carolyn Peri Weiss, Title III of the Vioknce Against Women Act:
Constitutionally Safe and Sound, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 723, 723 (1997). For analyses since the
Court's opinion, see also Goldscheid, supra note 43, at 109; MacKinnon, supra note 99, at
135.
123 See MacKinnon, supra note 99, at 139 (noting that VAWA's compromises in defer-
ence to the opposition of the judicial Conference foreshadowed its demise).
I" Unlike Lopez, which challenged a criminal statute, VAWA's provisions provided civil
rights protections historically enacted by Congress and assigned to the federal courts to
safeguard. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 294 (1964) (upholding the pub-
lic accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibited racial dis-
crimination in restaurants under the Commerce Clause powers). And unlike Lopez, where
Congress had made no findings regarding harm to interstate commerce flowing from the
regulated activity, the findings of such harm occasioned by violence against women were
overwhel  ' g. See Fine, supra note 122, at 267-68 (analyzing the inapplicability of Lopez to
VAWA).
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are often deliberately designed to prevent a woman's economic inde-
pendence. 126
The congressional findings in VAWA were entitled to great weight
and judicial deference, particularly where they were established after
arduous, fact-intensive, and lengthy investigation into the complexi-
ties of gender-based violence. 126 Although Congress has the institu-
tional capacity to determine the facts of gender-based violence and its
impact on the daily lives of its victims, the Court nonetheless side-
stepped its function of evaluating legislative judgement for rationality,
entering a realm outside its competence. 127 Rather than being guided
by the congressional findings and their illumination of the problem
of gender-based violence, the Court avoided the substance of the
findings and instead repudiated Congress' "method of reasoning. "128
This allowed the Court to substitute its own view that gender-based
violence has only indirect and attenuated effects on commerce. But
facts are facts: As the dissent noted, Congress' method of reasoning
"may be challenged, and some of the figures arrived at may be dis-
puted. But the sufficiency of the evidence before Congress to provide
a rational basis for the finding cannot seriously be questioned."129
Furthermore, there was virtual silence on the civil rights nature
of the Act and its effort to target invidious discrimination against an
identified discrete group. 1 " This silence was compounded by the
Court's failure to consider all of the legislative evidence holistically.
"3 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
"6 Activity which is proposed to be regulated is within the commerce power if a ra-
tional basis exists for Congress' determination that it sufficiently affects interstate com-
merce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557; Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990); Hodel v. Va. Sur-
face Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981); Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-
04.
127 See Walter v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 973 U.S. 305, 330 n.12 (1985) (hold-
ing that "[w]hen Congress makes findings on essentially factual issues ... those findings
are of course entitled to a great deal of deference, inasmuch as Congress is an institution
better equipped to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of date bearing on such an is-
sue"); A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme
Court's New "On The Record" Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 370 (2001)
(noting that the purposes of reviewing the record do not apply to a review of congressional
enactments). Such review is inconsistent with constitutional provisions and established
jurisprudential doctrines designed to shelter the federal legislative process from the threat
of judicial intrusion. See id. at 376.
128 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
129 Id. at 634 (Sauter, J., dissenting).
134 See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964) (discrimina-
tory impact of private conduct is not an impermissible motive or purpose for regulation
under the Commerce Clause); Goldscheid, supra note 43, at 132 (noting the Court's re-
fusal to recognize the civil rights nature of the Act).
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The Court, having previously approved congressional legislation of
intrastate activity under the Commerce Clause, where states were un-
able to address the regulated conduct, once again had the opportu-
nity to consider that very issue in Marrison. 131 By submerging the legis-
lative evidence of the states' failures in its consideration of the
Commerce Clause argument, the Court avoided permitting regula-
tion of gender-based violence on that ground.
Having quieted the evidence, the Court next restored domestic
violence to its historic category of family disputes, distancing it from
the realm of civil rights violations. By slighting the legislative evidence
about the unique nature of the conduct at issue in VAWA, the Court
stripped away its particular features, such that gender-based violence
could be scrutinized for Commerce Clause purposes as "any conduct,"
without reference to its structural significance as revealed in the legis-
lative hearings. 132 Having reduced gender-based violence to "any con-
duct," or even any criminal conduct, the Court then discursively
linked it with family law issues traditionally set aside for state regula-
tion and jurisdiction. 133 The Court acknowledged that, in the aggre-
gate, family law matters, including marriage, divorce, and child rear-
ing, affect the national economy—only to express its fear that VAWA
would expose federal courts to adjudicating them.lm Through this
rhetorical practice of connecting the adjudication of family law issues
131 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971); see also MacKinnon, supra note
99, at 150-51 (noting the Commerce Clause's history of upholding legislation for social
equality).
133 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 (emphasis added) (relying on Lopez in which the court
noted that any conduct" might be seen as having commercial affect in order to rationalize
its ruling that VAWA's regulated activity was not appropriate for regulation under the
Commerce Clause).
"3 Id. at 615 ("Petitioners' reasoning, moreover, will not limit Congress to regulating
violence but may, as we suggested in Lopez, be applied equally as well to family law and
other areas of traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce,
and childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant."). This linkage is
particularly troublesome because family relationships were not an element of the civil
rights act of VAWA.
134 Id. Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Stevens, Sauter and Ginsberg) in his dissent
criticizes the majority in this regard, suggesting that subject matters considered appropri-
ate for federal court jurisdiction may be changing in response to evolving social complexi-
ties. The dissent contends this potentiality is "not ... a jurisprudential defect, so much as it
reflects a practical reality" and suggests that scientific, technological, economical and envi-
ronmental change "makes it impossible for courts to develop meaningful subject-matter
categories" which might be reasonably excluded from Commerce Clause regulations. Id. at
1776 (Breyer, j., dissenting).
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with gender-motivated crimes of violence, the Court prohibited the
transformation of these issues to a national civil rights concern.'"
Finally, by identifying the adjudication of family law issues as a
chamber of horribles into which the Court would be dragged if VAWA
were upheld, the Court not only recategorized the problem, but rein-
forced the low-caste nature of family law cases. 136 Although there is no
constitutional imperative relegating these issues to state courts, 157 and
despite the debunking of the myth of state court expertise, the Court
nonetheless refused to engage in the task of shaping national norms
related to gender-based violence and women's legal concerns.'"
2. Issues Regarding Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
The Court relocated gender-based violence claims from a na-
tional arena to a local forum by resegregating the public and private
factors that underscore the tragedy of gender-based violence. By re-
jecting the Fourteenth Amendment claim on the ground that the Act
remedied private actions, the Court reinforced the public/private di-
chotomy that has long plagued women's issues in general and issues
of violence against women in particular.'" It was the very intersection
of gender-motivated violence by private actors with the states' failure
to provide equal protection of the laws which underlay the need for a
135 See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 88, at 165 (describing linguistic processes by
which issues may be shaped); see also Laura E. Little, Hiding With Words: Obfuscation, Avoid-
ance, and Federal Jurisdiction Opinion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 75, 80 (1999) (noting the observa-
tions of Court's use of rhetoric to formulate legal interpretations of the federal constitu-
tion).
l" Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 (referring, to "the specter" of federal courts adjudicating
family law issues). Jill Hasday notes that in Lopez, the Court "could agree on little else ex-
cept that Congress's commerce power does not reach 'family law (including marriage,
divorce, and child custody)'" (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564) and that the majority repeated
this proposition no less than four times. Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Recon-
structed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1298 (1998).
157 See Cahn, supra note 22, at 1073 (pointing out that no provision in the Constitution
nor federal diversity statutes prevents family law cases from being adjudicated in, the fed-
eral courts); Hasday, supra note 136, at 1299 (noting that there is no historical basis for
consigning family law matters to the local powers).
1S8 See Resnik, supra note 27, at 1010 (suggesting that federal judges should work with
state judges in the making of public decisions which affect norm definitions in this area).
By this standard, family law issues would be properly adjudicated in the federal courts
when affecting identifiable national issues. SeeAdler, supra note 29, at 256-57.
159 See generally, Peter Margulies, Representation of Domestic Violence Survivors as a New
Paradigm of Poverty Law: In Search of Access, Connection, and Voice, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1071
(1995) (discussing domestic violence issues particularly and the problem of the pub-
lic/private dichotomy).
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federal civil rights action.'" The interrelationship between a private
actor/abuser and the states that failed to provide a remedy left
women vulnerable to harm and should have been sufficient for the
Court to uphold VAWA. 141
Private actions motivated by gender animus were properly trans-
formed by VAWA into public civil rights concerns. The states' failure
to provide protection against such violations constituted another civil
rights violation.' 42 The civil rights provision was enacted to afford a
remedy, not only for discriminatory violence, but also for the dispa-
rate treatment at the hands of state systems. The combination of
forces at work which leave women vulnerable justified such a rem-
edy. 145
By providing a federal remedy, VAWA unhinged gender-based
violence from its historic private and local domain, and marked a re-
conceptualization of domestic violence as a pressing public and na-
tional social problem. VAWA situated both the causes and conse-
quences on an economic and political map, identified it as a civil
rights concern, revealed the structural nature of the problem, and
declared state systems' treatment of the issues unequal and discrimi-
natory. The Act moved beyond the more socially accepted model of
criminal intervention and granted plaintiff status to battered women,
conferring upon them a civil rights cause of action in the name of na-
tional interests.
The Act stands in stark contrast to the Court's decision, which
reflexively reclassified the problem as non-economic activity and as
domestic disputes inappropriate for federal court intervention.'" Its
140 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
141 As the Court points out, in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 756 (1966), such ac-
tive connivance was found in upholding the constitutionality of a federal statute criminaliz-
ing conspiracies to deprive blacks of equal access to state facilities on the basis that the
indictment expresses alleged state involvement. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 622-23. As
Catharine MacKinnon points out, this state involvement was achieved because the conspir-
acy involved a plan to cause the arrest of blacks. MacKinnon, supra note 99, at 157. The
legislative findings demonstrating that the states deprived women of equal protection of
the laws after a gender motivated attack should have been sufficient in Morrison.
142 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3
(1989) (a state may not deny protective services to "certain disfavored minorities without
violating the Equal Protection Clause").
143 See MacKinnon, supra note 99, at 153 (arguing that neither history nor precedent
require that statutes enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment address only state
action and that, further, both favor the upholding of VAWA).
144 See Goldscheid, supra note 43, at 129-30 (noting that Congress intended to regulate
domestic violence as a civil rights violation historically and firmly regulated by federal judi-
cial authority).
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defeat sheds light upon a problematic legal culture within which these
claims must be resolved, and highlights the difficulty in changing
styles of discourse about gender-based violence.
In the end, the Court returned women to state systems that rou-
tinely use procedures which suffer from and perpetuate institutional-
ized gender inequality. Although several fronts on which to combat
gender-based violence remain, most women will once again be re-
stricted to the states. The next challenge will be to demand states do
what the Supreme Court claims they do best: regulate families and
crime."5
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL MECHANISMS OF FAILURE
The method by which VAWA's civil rights remedy met its demise
is consistent with the historical hierarchies that have cast gender-
based violence in terms of domestic disputes, routine assaults, and as
a burden on the judiciary. 146 The Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Morrison reflects and reproduces the problems that gave rise
to the federal remedy in the first place; it replicates and is replicated
in the unfavorable treatment that domestic violence claims receive in
state courts. Thus, an understanding of VAWA's defeat is enhanced by
an examination of domestic violence law in the state courts, revealing
a cultural system with accumulated practices and procedures by which
the relative importance of these claims can be measured. 147
This section describes the legal culture of domestic violence in
state courts. It serves as a topographical study of civil protection order
proceedings and describes the values, practices, beliefs, behaviors,
and myths that set the rules for how domestic violence claims are
handled. It reviews the mechanisms by which this culture is main-
tained and perpetuated, and examines the deleterious results of this
legal culture for battered women. Just as important, state civil reme-
dies, now the principal means for obtaining relief, also deserve closer
145 See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,618 (2000) (stating that there was no better example of
police power granted to the states and denied the federal government than 'suppression
of violent crime and vindication of its victims").
146 See SUP/17 notes 74-76 and accompanying text; Siegel, supra note 44, at 2119 (noting
the historical principles by which domestic violence claims were rendered as private con-
cerns).
H7 See Engle Merry, supra note 24, at 575-76 (noting that law serves as a symbolic and
cultural system which is revealed as a series of practices and discourses); J. Harvie Wilkin-
son 111, supra note 28, at )596 (describing the law as a phenomenon of culture, and citing
PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
(1999)).
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scrutiny in order to fashion strategies to improve outcomes in domes-
tic violence cases.
A. Civil Protection Orders Generally
Civil protection orders are court orders used for prohibiting acts
of domestic violence committed by one party against another.'"
These orders can be issued in all states to protect a victim from con-
tinued violence.'" Eligibility for relief varies from state to state, but
the goals are consistent: to provide victims immediate and long-term
protection from the violence inflicted by a domestic partner. 15° To
accomplish these goals, most state statutes authorize comprehensive
relief and may offer significant protection to battered women. 151
Judges have authority to structure legal protection to reduce the pos-
sibility of subsequent serious injury or death in these civil matters,
' 48 See Klein & Orloff, supra note 15, at 814. See also Developments in the Law: Legal Re-
sponses to Domestic Violence IL Traditional Mechanisms of Response to Domestic Violence, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1505, 1510 [hereinafter Legal Responses to Domestic Violence] (defining civil
protection orders).
149 See Epstein, supra note 11, at 11.
150
 Eligibility varies both in terms of the status of the party entitled to relief and the
precipitating acts warranting an order. See BARBARA J. HART, STATE CODES ON DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: ANALYSIS, COMMENTARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1992, at 5 (noting that most
state statutes specify eligible abused persons as family or household members, broadly
defined as spouses or persons who have lived together, parents and children, current or
former sexual or intimate partners, and, on occasion, persons who have been in dating or
intimate relationships with each other). Prohibited behavior includes, but is not limited to,
causing or attempting to cause physical harm, placing another in fear of imminent harm,
and various sexual relations crimes. Id at 6. See Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note
148, at 1510 (noting that civil protection orders are designed to prevent future abuse).
151 See Epstein, supra note 11, at 11 (noting that every state has a domestic violence in-
junction statute and that the majority of these provide for comprehensive or ancillary re-
lief). At least half the states authorize attorney fees and other costs, and at least one-fourth
of the states permit monetary compensation to be awarded to the victim. See HART, supra
note 150, at 5, 15-17. In this article, the term "comprehensive relief" refers to the enumer-
ated provisions found in most statutes that allow judges to include within a domestic vio-
lence injunction determinations of child custody, visitation terms, child support, spousal
support, exclusive use of the home, possession of personal property, confiscation of weap-
ons, attorneys fees, and other relief designed to keep a woman safe from abuse. This relief
is often referred to as ancillary or supplementary to what is often considered the primary
aspect of relief: restraining or prohibiting further acts of violence. The author is grateful to
the suggestions of Valerie Despres, Coordinating Attorney for North Carolina Legal Serv-
ices Domestic Violence Project, that the term "ancillary" may suggest somehow that this
relief is secondary to the issue of protection from harm and that the term "comprehensive
relief" may better reflect the nature of the remedy. See Susan L. Keilitz, Civil Protection Or-
ders: A Viable Justice System Tool for Deterring Domestic Violence, VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS, Vol. 9,
No. 1, at 82 (1994).
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thereby providing courts with a wider range of dispositional powers
than in criminal cases. 152
The effectiveness of domestic violence injunctions, however, de-
pends on whether a judge orders comprehensive relief which not only
enjoins further violence but also remediates the consequences of past
violence.'" Civil protection injunctions can provide affirmative relief
for battered women by setting conditions, creating opportunities, and
distributing resources as needed. For example, an order may include
provisions which grant exclusive use of the parties' residence to the
battered woman, make custody and visitation determinations, order
child and spousal support where applicable, grant to the victim other
personal property likely to enhance her safety while denying the
abuser possession of other property with which he may carry out fur-
ther harm, and order the abuser to a batterer's treatment program. 154
This form of relief can be a means of legal intervention that respects
and restores women's ability to lead their own lives without intrusion
by abusers.
Civil protection orders present, to the parties and to the courts,
challenges which are often related to the emergency nature of domes-
tic violence matters. They are expedited proceedings scheduled on
short notice in order to maximize protection for the victim. 155 Hear-
ings are set within two weeks or less of filing, usually without discov-
ery. 156 Victims often appear pro se and may have a difficult time navi-
gating the legal system, particularly in light of the fear they may
experience of facing the batterer in court.'" Judges express concern
152 See Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 929 (D.C. 1991); Peter Finn and Sarah Col-
son, Civil Protection Orders: Legislation, Current Court Practice and Enforcement, 2 NAT'L INST.
OF JUSTICE (1990).
153 Finn & Colson, supra note 152, at 33; Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Chtiers of Protec-
tion in Domestic Violence Cases: an Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 'Dot.
J. WOMEN & L. 163, 167 (1993). See Lenore M.J. Simon, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach
to the Legal Processing of Domestic Violence Cases, 1 PSYCHOL. Pus. POL'Y & L. 43, 77-78
(1995); see also Deborah Knight, Protection Orders: How Effective Are They!, NAT'L BULL. ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PREVENTION, Dec. 1995, Vol. 1 No. 6, at 2-3 (interviewing Lois Can-
tor, Director of Northeastern University Law School's Domestic Violence Clinic who states
that "The more comprehensive and specific the order is about what the abuser cannot do,
the better.").
154 See HART, supra note 150, at 14-17, 23 (noting that the usefulness of protection or-
ders is dependent on provisions that are specific, comprehensive, and precise. Orders
must spell out with specificity the terms of "no contact."); see also Finn & Colson, supra note
152, at 33.
155 HART, supra note 150, at 7-8, 25; See Klein & Orloff, supra note 15, at 1040, 1054.
1m Klein & Orloff, supra note 15, at 1054.
152 Id. at 1048-49.
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over their inability to dedicate sufficient time to fashion comprehen-
sive protection orders. 168
Although progress has been made through state legislative en-
actments, there is a critical disjuncture between formal law on the one
hand, and the implementation of the statutes by the courts in matters
involving domestic vioknce, on the other. 169 Women are often unable
to obtain comprehensive relief within the domestic violence injunc-
tion hearing process.160
 Domestic violence proceedings are often
truncated; battered women may be precluded from presenting their
evidence, which may result in denial of orders. 161 Alternatively, judges
often encourage parties to negotiate outside the formal adjudicatory
process, rather than to litigate, even though it has been well estab-
lished that mediation is undesirable in domestic violence matters. 162
Judges frequently fail to grant relief such as custody and child sup-
15° See infra notes 178-181 and accompanying text.
1" See generally Kim Susser, Weighing the Domestic Violence Factor in Custody Cases: Tipping
the Scales in Favor of Protecting Victims and Their Children, 27 FORDHAM Utus. L.J. 875(2000)
(noting that despite state statutory changes requiring courts to consider domestic violence
when making a custody determination, courts continued to ignore domestic violence as a
factor); see also Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in
Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV, 379, 432 (1991) (suggesting that bad outcomes
in battered women's homicide cases are more a result of the judicial application of statu-
tory definitions rather than the statutory provisions themselves).
160 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text; Kinports & Fischer, supra note 153, at
195, 197 (noting a study of the impact of domestic violence statutes revealed that judges
were not awarding the full range of remedies provided); HART, supra note 150, at 24 n.219
(reporting on a study indicating that judges were awarding significantly less relief than
requested by battered women); Meeting the Legal Needs of Battered Women in North Carolina, in
NORTH CAROLINA COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1995) [hereinafter NC Suit-
vxv] (reporting on statewide survey of domestic violence programs indicating that judges
regularly fail to issue "meaningful protection orders" and that most judges fail to include
provisions for custody, child support, visitation, and exclusive use of possession of the
home) (on file with the author); JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM:
THE POWER OF JUDICIAL RESPONSES 129 (1999) (noting that judges often do not order
child support in domestic violence proceedings as it. is not considered important). See also
Simon, supra note 153, at 47 (noting that, historically, domestic violence injunctions have
not been readily available to victims at all).
161 See Lisa Memoli & Gina Plotino, Enforcement or Pretense: The Courts and the Domestic
Violence Act, 15 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 39, 47 (1993) (noting that the average time for each
domestic violence case to be heard in New Jersey was approximately 5 minutes and 45
seconds); PTACEK, supra note 160, at 161 (reporting that in some courts studied in Massa-
chusetts, a judge disposed of 8 consecutive civil protection order hearings in less that 18
minutes. He makes a "favorable" comparison with another judge who took 1 hour and 45
minutes to dispose of the same number. The second judge spent an average of 13 minutes
per hearing as opposed to approximately 2 minutes per hearing spent by the first judge).
162 See generally Kelly Rowe, The Limits of the Neighborhood Justice Center: Why Domestic Vio-
lence Cases Should Not Be Mediated, 34 Etdoxv U. 855 (1985).
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port, notwithstanding specific statutory authority to do so. 165 They of-
ten refuse to restrict visitation, despite proof of threats of violence. 164
The challenges posed by expedited schedules, time constraints,
pro se litigants, and other daily complications in the legal system,
must be considered in order to correct difficulties with the law. These
problems are serious, but they are perhaps easier to remedy—if not to
suffer—than problems that arise from systemic inequality. In domestic
violence cases, the law's malfunctioning results from an even more
deleterious set of relations between the legal system and a group of
litigants. The historic belief that domestic violence matters have no
legitimate place in the courts is centrally implicated in the failure of
the legal system to address them.
At issue are deeper structural problems which provide the ingre-
dients for the subordinated treatment of gender-based violence
claims. The legacy of past indifference to domestic violence claims,
whereby wife beating found countenance in doctrinal law, continues
to insinuate itself in modern jurisprudence.165 While the law has
evolved from the blatant legal sanctioning of wife abuse to a standard
that declares such matters to be private concerns beyond its reach,
these principles continue to act on court decisions in a less covert
fashion, but always with devastating consequences. 166 Despite shifting
forms that often obscure the most flagrant forms of inequality, the
perpetuation of certain judicial practices expresses a view that domes-
tic violence claims are unwelcome in the courts.
B. Examining Operational Difficulties: Domestic Violence
Claims in the Courts
In the state courts, domestic violence claims suffer as a result of
processes and predilections that require investigation and analysis.
This section explores the stratification and development of hierarchi-
cal values that affect gender-based violence as a legal claim, the cate-
003 Epstein, supra note 11, at 43 (noting almost half of the domestic violence agencies
from across the country report that judges refuse to grant relief such as custody, child sup-
port, and other forms of financial relief in domestic violence hearings).
'" Chris O'Sullivan, Estimating the Population at Risk for Violence During Child Visitation,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORT, June/July 2000, Vol. 5, No. 5, at 65, 79 (noting that courts in
New York City and Westchester, N.Y. rarely exercise the option of denying visitation when
there is a risk of violence).
163 See Siegel, supra note 44, at 2197 (arguing that despite a change in rules and rheto-
ric, there may be no substantive changes with regard to the treatment of gender violence).
" 60 /d. at 2119, 2120.
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gorization of disputes as private or public, and the insinuation of
prejudices into the decision-making process. This discussion serves to
examine the mechanisms which render battered women's claims un-
successful in the courts.
1. Hierarchy and Status
Domestic violence cases, like family law cases in general, are no
more welcomed by state judges than they are by the federal judici-
ary. 167
 In the hierarchy of legal tasks, the nature of the judicial work in
domestic violence cases is assigned lesser status; it is considered less
important work, less prestigious, often trivial in nature. 168
 Domestic
violence claims usually entail imprecise and sometimes conflicting
factual accounts and judges often resent the need to sort through the
facts, particularly with unrepresented litigants. 169 Judges often regard
these cases as "burdensome, fact-bound and often protracted . . . dis-
putes."170
 They are seen as steerage cases—legal actions of low status
that are bothersome and difficult. 171
 That most domestic violence suits
167 See Epstein, supra note 11, at 42-43 (observing that judges consider domestic vio-
lence matters as "unimportant work"); Martha Minow, 'Forming Underneath Everything that
Grows:• Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819, 819 (1985) (noting that fam-
ily law's low status within the profession is well-known).
168 See Advocating for Victims. of Domestic Violence, 20 WOMEN 'S RTS. L. REP. 73, 77 (1999)
[hereinafter Advocating for Victims) (panel discussion featuring a newly appointed judge
assigned to domestic violence cases who stated that matters she considers trivial, i.e., "if
someone just gives the other person a shove," nonetheless may be brought to court under
the domestic violence statute); Judith Resnik, Visible on "Women's Issues," 77 IOWA L. REV.
41, 48 (1991); see aisa Jessica Pearson, Court Services: Meeting the Needs of Twenty-First Century
Families, 33 FAM. L.Q. 617, 630 (1999) (noting the low status of family law cases and its
implications for domestic violence cases).
lest Cf. Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal Thal
Courts, 24 GA. L. REV. 909, 963 (1990) (describing comparable negative reactions of fed-
eral judges when adjudicating "routine" claims which require them to decipher conflicting
accounts about what happened, particularly where there is no attorney). Because most
state statutes set forth a mechanism for pro se representation, there are more plaintiffs in
domestic violence injunction proceedings representing themselves than in other cases,
including custody and divorce cases which are less likely to be litigated pro se. See HART,
supra note 150, at 7 (noting that two-thirds of state statutes have provisions which enable
abused persons to file pro se).
170 Cahn, supra note 22, at 1097.
171 SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN-LEGAL CONSCIOUS-
NESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS 14-15 (1990) (noting that interpersonal cases
are regarded as "garbage cases" and low-status matters).
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are presented by women attorneys and poor peoples' lawyers may also
detract from their perceived importance) , "
Judges generally take a dim view of sitting on the family court
bench where civil domestic violence claims are typically adjudi-
cated, 175 Newly appointed judges are frequently assigned to family
courts, sometimes at the expense of the litigants whose complex do-
mestic violence cases serve as judicial on-the-job training. 174 Family
court is often regarded as so undesirable that judges are assigned with
the promise of a "promotion" to general civil or criminal divisions and
are allowed to rotate out after one year. 175
 Judges are usually grateful
to escape assignment to specialized domestic violence courts. 176 Al-
172 Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lauyering Process: Lessons from
Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247, 258-60 (1993) (noting that although
there are no exact figures, it is likely that female lawyers represent battered women more
frequently than male lawyers). Id. at 249 (noting that gender bias against women litigants
cannot be eliminated until the female lawyers who frequently represent them are no
longer the subject of bias themselves). Recent Department of Justice VAWA grants have
increased the number of legal services lawyers devoted to claims of domestic violence, and
legal services programs report a significant percentage of their work is related to spouse
abuse claims. See Civil Legal Assistance Project Summaries, available at tittp:/ /www.o jp.
usdo•gov/vawo/stategrants.hun (last visited September 9, 2000). See Marc Galanter, "Old
and in the Way": The Corning Demographic Transformation of The Legal Profession and its Implica-
tions for the Provision of Legal Services, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 1081, 1107 (1999) (indicating that
even experienced legal services attorneys may lack the Militia of status).
ns See Pearson, supra note 168, at 628 (noting that judges on the family court display
lack of interest, of temperament, or understanding with respect to family law cases gener-
ally); see also Cahn, supra note 22, at 1091; Billie Lee Dunsford-fackson, et al., Unified Family
Courts: Now Will They Serve Victims of Domestic Violence, 32 FAM. L.Q. 131, 131 (1998) (dis-
cussing Family Court processing of domestic violence claims); Frances G. Hill, What's Fam-
ily Court, and What's in It for The Lawyer,. in Ras GESTAE, 26 (Nov. 20, 2000) (noting pilot
family courts to handle domestic violence claims); Betsy Tsai, Note, The Trend Thward Spe-
cialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORM-1AM L. REV.
1285, 1290 (2000) (noting that family courts handle domestic violence claims).
174 See Memoli & Plotino, supra note 161, at 49 n.143; see also Advocating for Victims, su-
pra note 168, at 78 (quoting remarks by a judge who notes that new judges are assigned to
family and domestic violence courts to learn by "baptism by fire" despite the difficulty of
these cases); Andrea Weigil, Special Court Caught in Crossfire, NEWS & OBSERVER, (Raleigh,
N.C.), Oct. 12, 2000, at B1 (noting complaints about the fact that untrained and inexperi-
enced judges and prosecutors are assigned to North Carolina's Wake County special do-
mestic violence court).
176 See Memoli & Plotino, supra note 161, at 49 n.143; see also Cahn, supra note 22, at
1091.
176 See ENGLE MERRY, supra note 171, at 15 (those who handle Interpersonal" cases in
the court have the lowest status); Ellen K. Solender, Report on Miscommunication Problems
Between the Family Courts and Domestic Violence Victims, 19 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 155, 159
(1998) (noting that family court judges were pleased with the establishment of a separate
civil protection order court so that they could be "relieved of this burdensome part of their
docket").
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though judicial education is considered critical as a means to improve
the treatment of domestic violence claims, and proposals to improve
court responses to the problem often include formal judicial educa-
tion programs, judges are often reluctant to include domestic vio-
lence issues in their. training programs.'"
Dislike of domestic violence claims leads judges to dispense what
may best be described as perfunctory justice.'" Under the guise of
maintaining judicial efficiency, battered women's cases are hurried
through. In some jurisdictions, the average time allotted for each
domestic violence case ranges from between two minutes and fifteen
seconds and five minutes and forty-five seconds.'" Other courts
schedule approximately forty civil protection cases with the expecta-
tion of hearing only two to three cases. 180
 Complaints about excessive
litigation and over-crowded dockets are repeated without sufficient
supporting empirical evidence. 181
With efficiency as a pretext, courts may categorically refuse to
consider issues properly raised in civil protection order proceed-
ings. 182
 They may dismiss custody issues outright, particularly where
in See Laura Gotland, Courts Behaving Badly, 83 A.B.A. J. 30, 31 (1997) (noting that
judges are reluctant to participate in judicial education programs about domestic violence,
citing Judith Resnik, if you [told] a group of judges, 'Let's have a seminar on constitu-
tional law,' they wouldn't say, 'We don't need to talk about that. We've already talked about
that.'"); Lynn Hecht Schafran, There's No Accounting for Judges, 58 AL13. L. REV. 1063, 1072-
74 (1995) (noting that judicial education is critical but is lacking in many states);
Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender in Evidence: Masculine Norms vs. Feminist Reforms, 19 Hmtv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 127, 166 (1996) (describing feminist education campaigns that are designed
to remove gender bias from the courts, and judicial education programs as a feminist
strategy for improving outcomes for battered women in the courts).
na See Tsai, supra note 173, at 1293-94 (describing cursory treatment of domestic vio-
lence cases in court).
179 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
180 Margaret Martin Barry, The Downside of Benign intent, 5 Am. U. J. GENDER Soc. P0L'Y
& L. 433, 437 (1997) (noting that in the D.C. area, although forty civil protection order
hearings were often scheduled each day, the courts could only accommodate two to three
hearings). See PTACEK, supra note 160.
lam See Rhode, supra note 98, at 996-97 (noting that if there is an increase in civil litiga-
tion, business, not domestic violence cases, are the largest and fastest growing category of
civil litigation); see also ENGLE MERRY, supra note 171, at 17 (questioning the debate about
litigiousness and noting that there is '`no clear evidence that the litigation explosion has
touched the lower courts").
182 See, e.g., V.C. v. H.C., Sr., 257 A.D.2d 27, 31 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (trial court refus-
ing to consider exclusive use of the residence in a protection order hearing); see also Kin-
ports & Fischer, supra note 153, at 195, 206 (noting that judges believe that women should
be satisfied with relief limited to prohibiting further acts of violence and that other issues,
including custody, can be taken care of in a divorce); Bernadette Dunn Sewell, History of
Abuse: Societal, Judicial, and Legislative Responses to the Problem of Wife Beating, 23 SUFFOLK U.
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women appear pro se despite statutory provisions authorizing custody
awards, and instead require battered women to file separation, di-
vorce, or custody actions.'" Courts are often unwilling to consider
property and financial support issues although properly raised in civil
protection order proceedings. 184 Judges may even be unwilling to
hear testimony about the violence itself Their demeanor reflects
their decisions: they may act bored, impatient, or otherwise indicate
that they are in a hurry to get through the proceedings, and often
reveal little empathy for the battered woman. 186
2. Domestic Violence as Private Matters
Domestic violence cases suffer as a result of the courts' general
dislike for matters involving personal problems. 187 Courts equate do-
mestic violence claims with "family problems, as private matters, as
sexual miscommunication."'" When cast in the private realm, the
matter moves into "spheres of activity that are or ought to be free of
governmental involvement." The dichotomy between the public
and the private exercises a strong hold on the judiciary, despite efforts
to expose the fallacy that most issues can be strictly categorized solely
as either. 18° Adherence to the distinction between public and private
L. REV. 983, 1011 (1989) (noting that judges often believe that domestic violence is an
isolated event best handled by another court or social service agency).
183 See Kinports & Fischer, supra note 153, at 195, 206; NC SURVEY, supra note 160 (not-
ing that judges routinely told women who appeared pro se in domestic violence injunction
proceedings that they needed to hire an attorney to seek custody).
184 See Kinports & Fischer, supra note 153, at 205.
185 See Symposium, Women, Children, and Domestic Violence: Current Thusions and Emerging
Issues, 27 FORDIIAM URB. L.J. 567, 590 (2000) (comments from Leah Hill describing the
"quieting of violence" where judges refused to allow domestic violence victims to describe
the incidents fully).
188 See PTACEK, supra note 160, at 101; see, e.g., Kathleen Waits, Battered Women and Their
Children: Lessons from One Woman's Story, 35 Hous. L. REV. 29, 57 (1998) (quoting a bat-
tered woman's story: The judge seemed bored and annoyed when I started to cry. He
asked 'How much longer is this going to take? Are we almost done here?'").
187 See ENGLE MERRY, supra note 171, at 1 (observing that courts in this country do not
like addressing problems that arise between neighbors, friends, lovers, and spouses).
188 See supra note 69 and accompanying text,
188 Anita L. Allen, Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace, 52. STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1177 n.11
(2000) (quoting ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY
33 (1988)).
190 See Penelope E. Andrews, Globalization, Human Rights and Critical Race Feminism:
Voices from the Margins, 3 J. GENDER RACE &PST. 373, 396 (2000) (observing that this con-
struct harms women in the context of international law as well); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 Mtut. L. REV.
707, 776-77 (1991) (calling for the rejection of the public/private dichotomy as a "coher-
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fuels courts' determination to avoid judicial involvement in these mat-
ters. 191
Narrative accounts of domestic violence unfold in court within
the context of personal or intimate relationships. The narratives often
appear to judges as problems relating to personality flaws, relation-
ships gone bad, anger and jealousy, and hence are easy to reject as
legal problems.192
 Judges decline to consider factors outside the rela-
tionship which might facilitate understanding of the context of do-
mestic violence, including economic, political, and socio-cultural di-
mensions of the problem. 193
 As a result, few opportunities are
available to expose the formations of power within relationships that
are related less to privacy issues than to patriarchy, where women are
routinely prevented from exercising choices to stay or to leave, and
where the harm that occurs is visited upon women as a category
rather than a woman as an individual.
By confining the problem to the boundaries of personal relation-
ships, moreover, domestic violence is represented as a deviation from
idealized notions of family values. 194
 Victims are often blamed for
causing and/or contributing to the abuse they have suffered.195
 The
proposition of domestic violence as deviant behavior between inti-
mate partners not only allows judges to discount a victim's credibility,
but also creates additional incentive for judges to decline to identify
the patterns and larger consequences of these acts.
The characterization of the issue as private also has consequences
for the method of intervention. In family law cases generally, there is
a trend toward the privatization of dispute resolution. This demon-
ent way of thinking about political legitimacy and social order"); G. Kristian Miccio, Notes
From The Underground: Battered Women, the State, and Conceptions of Accountability, 23 HARY.
WOMEN'S L.J. 133, 155 (2000) (noting that such dichotomy results in state collaboration
with batterers and the perpetuation of violence).
191 See Pearson, supra note 168, at 621 (noting that mediation has become the pre-
dominant method of resolving domestic matters).
192 See ENGLE MERRY, supra-note 1'71, at 14 (arguing that courts view cases such as do-
mestic violence claims as interpersonal disputes which are not welcomed in the court);
Kinports & Fischer supra note 153, at 201 (courts considering domestic violence as just "a
fight between two people").
193 See Kinports Sc Fischer, supra note 153, at 200-01 (noting courts' refusal to consider
anything but the specific incident that triggered the filing of the petition).
104 See DEBORAH RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY 114
(1997) (noting that battering relationships are described as "sadomasochistic on both sides"
despite the lack of support for such pronouncement).
195 Id. See also Solender, supra note 176, at 156 (describing the results of a study where
judges in domestic violence claims had difficulty understanding that domestic violence was
not provoked or otherwise related to the actions of the victim).
2001]	 Gender-based Violence as Judicial Anomoly	 1117
straws, in not so subtle ways, the lower value with which courts view
these cases. 196 Family law cases, , often including domestic violence
matters, are regularly referred to mediation, attorney masters, and
non-lawyer court counselors. 197 Judges who may champion the notion
of private settlements as the best resolution, fail to discriminate
among the types of cases which are suitable for such dispositions.m
Judges favor attorneys who compromise and present consent orders
for approval by the court. 199 Judges assign responsibility for domestic
violence elsewhere and defend their preferred position of judicial in-
sulation in order to avoid the difficult task of intervention in domestic
196 See Clare Dalton, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 366 (1997) (noting that some lawyers
would prefer not to represent victims because they may face hostility when they do); Ep-
steM, supra note 11, at 42 (reporting that judges do not want these cases in their court-
room); Zanita E. Fenton, Mirrored Silence: Reflections on Judicial Complicity in Private Violence,
78 OR. L. REV. 995, 1009 (1999) (noting that judges treat domestic violence as private
matters).
197 See Pearson, supra note 168, at 621 (noting that by 1998, all but six states had stat-
utes that included family mediation of some type). Courts may require parent education
programs. Id. at 622-23. "Parent coordinators" or "domestic case managers" may be as-
signed by courts where parties file a certain number of motions in a family matter, and
intake workers may be required to screen family law litigants to determine to which alter-
native dispute resolution they must be referred. Id. at 626. Some unified family courts re-
quire case management, much of which relies heavily on non-attorney court counselors or
case managers and includes mandatory use of alternative dispute resolution techniques.
See also O'Neill v. Stone, 721 So.2d 393, 394 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (domestic violence
proceeding referred to a general master/attorney), Mallin v. Mallin, 541 N.E.2d 116, 116
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (noting that a domestic violence claim had been heard by a referee);
Cheryl Daniels Howell, North Carolina's Experiment with Family Court, POPULAR Gov"r, Vol.
65, Summer 2000, at 15, 17. Despite the research and some state statutes which discourage
domestic violence from being mediated, these cases are also referred for private dispute
resolution; Amy B. Levin, Child Witnesses of Domestic Violence: How Should Judges Apply the Best
Interests of the Child Standard in Custody and Visitation Cases Involving Domestic Violence? 47
UCLA L. REV. 813, 829 (2000) (noting that courts often refer domestic violence cases to
mediators who are untrained in the dynamics of domestic violence).
"a This is generally true in both federal and state courts. See Resnik, supra note 27, at
1000 (noting the "federal judiciary's growing commitment to party accord and informal
processes").
199 Martin Barry, supra note 180, at 433-34 (noting that judges try to encourage con-
sent orders to avoid having to hear contested cases). In North Carolina, one judge has
fashioned his own "consent" order which he urges litigants to consider. The order has no
findings of fact nor conclusions of law and gives no indication of wrongdoing by the per-
petrator nor vindication to the battered woman who has sought court intervention. There
is pressure, however subtle, exerted on the parties to enter into this "consent" order in lieu
of a hearing. Barbara Hart, a national domestic violence expert has noted that domestic
violence attorneys often practice before judges who do not like attorneys who litigate fam-
ily law issues. They prefer attorneys who conciliate and settle their cases. Barbara Hart
(unpublished written comments, July 30, 1999) (on file with author).
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violence matters.200 They shirk their responsibility to hear testimony,
to make findings, to determine outcomes, and otherwise to treat
these cases like cognizable legal claims." 1
3. Gender Bias: The Court's Compass
The beliefs that domestic violence issues are less important, pri-
vate, and not the courts' concerns are often related to and expressed
as biases of judges, affecting the outcome of each case." 2 Bias may be
understood as a result of cognitive functions and experiential deficits.
But perhaps more importantly, it must be discerned as a condition
that gives shape to the legal cultural practices and structures by which
women experience discouraging outcomes in court.
Judges are dependent on cognitive strategies shaped by their past
experiences that result in stereotypical assumptions. 203 The vast major-
ity of judges who generally endeavor to be fair-minded draw on a res-
ervoir of views and presumptions that may operate at a subtle and un-
intentional level.204
 But judges make decisions which affect the lives of
others and thus are responsible for recognizing and countering the
200 Cf. Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L REV.
1275, 1338 (1999). Bandes describes the mechanisms used by judges to avoid taking a
stand against police brutality and illuminates judicial mechanisms which parallel those of
judges who avoid domestic violence issues. She notes that there is a strong preference for
judicial insulation which judges maintain by invoking various devices to assure that they do
not have to take a stand against the status quo.
2° 1 Martin Barry, supra note 180, at 437 (noting that judges prefer not having to make
any decisions in domestic violence cases). See, e.g., In re VC., 257 A.D.2d at 31 (where the
trial court is reported to have refused to consider a victim's request for exclusive use of the
residence after findings of abuse, stating, "If the petitioner wants the apartment she will
have to take appropriate action in the appropriate court. This is not the court for this. You
can have a hearing for 20 months and I will never rule on who gets this apartment. It's not
before me.").
202 See Gatland, supra note 177, at 30. See generally Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, A junsdic-
tional Approach to Common Law Legal Analysis, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 269, 269 (1999) (describ-
ing a theoretical framework for analyzing judicial decision-making which includes the in-
dividual biases of judges).
403 See Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and justice: Ensur-
ing the Fairness offuvenile Delinquency Thais, 33 WAKE FOREST L REv. 553, 575 n.81 (1998);
Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judi-
cial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.C. L. REV. 1377, 1500 (1998) (observing that legal analysis is affected
by a judge's "range of personal and political preferences," and a "specialized cultural com-
petence" [based on] his knowledge and experience "'in the law'").
2°4 See Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1994) (noting
that natural mental processes of categorization allow a judge to use information efficiently
but not without compromising impartiality in the decision-making process).
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resulting impairment to impartiality.205 Regardless of intent, in do-
mestic violence cases, the effect of cognitive strategies may impair rea-
soning, distort the facts, reduce battered women's claims to stereo-
types, and result in systematically biased decisions. 206
Experiential deficits skew the courts' understanding of the expe-
riences of battered women. Judges, both male and female, often lack
an understanding of the circumstances in which battered women
must calculate survival strategies on a daily basis. 2" The problem is
compounded further by the fact that most presiding judges are men.
In fact, men are not ordinarily victimized by an intimate partner. 205
The choice between domestic violence and homelessness is not one
men often confront. Child abuse or neglect allegations for remaining
in an abusive relationship are not charges that men ordinarily face. 2®
In these cases, prevailing assumptions about independent and
autonomous individuals who freely choose to be, or not to be, in an
abusive relationship are based on cultural norms which are contrary
205 Id. at 20 (calling on judges to take steps to counter the influence of bias on their
decisions and when unable to do so in a specific case, to disqualify themselves). See generally
Penny J. White, Surviving the Politics ofJudging, 20 J. NAT'L ADMIN. L. JUDGES 149 (2000)
(noting that by accepting the responsibilities of being a judge, one must counter facets of
human nature).
209 Psychologists and behavioral scientists describe the mechanisms by which a process
of categorization allows a judge to use information efficiently but not without compromis-
ing impartiality in the decision-making process. See Nugent, supra note 204, at 10-11; AM-
STERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 88, at 24 (noting that "category systems are often used
liegemonically, as instruments of power" and that gender-based category systems place
women at the bottom), Cf. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 203, at 571 (describing how
the distorting influences of managing information results in bias in juvenile cases).
2°7 Although the numbers of women judges have been increasing, it has yet to be de-
termined if they adjudicate in a manner sufficiently different from their male counter-
parts. See generally Michael E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley, Rethinking Feminist Judging, 70
L.J. 891, 891 (1995). The process of judicial selection and socialization may minimize
differences in values between men and women judges. Id. at 906 n.112. However, studies
demonstrate that at least in the area of employment discrimination, a judge's gender is an
important factor. Id, This is likely a result of women judges having been subjected to gen-
der discrimination themselves or because they can better empathize with those who have.
Id. That women judges would more easily empathize with victims of domestic violence is a
plausible assumption.
202 Ninety-five percent of victims are women. Klein & Orloff, supra note 15, at 808.
2°9 Id. An estimated 50% of the homeless population are women and children fleeing
abuse. See Joan Zorza, Women Battering: A Major Cause of Homelessness, 25 CLEARINGUOUSE
REV. 420, 420 (1991). Forty-four percent of cities surveyed by the U.S. Conference of May-
ors identified domestic violence as a primary cause of homelessness; see also Lynn Hecht
Schafran, Is the Law Male? Let Me Count The Ways, 69 C131.-KENT L. REV. 397, 408 (1993)
(noting that it is common to blame mothers but not fathers for children's problems);
Waxman & Trupin, A Status Report on Hunger and Homelessness in America's Cities, 1997 U.S.
Conference of Mayors, Washington, D.C.
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to the realities of those women who are without such choices. 21° Ideo-
logical axioms that define "leaving" as the logical and rational re-
sponse to domestic violence create a construct whereby women who
do not conform to this convention are viewed with suspicion and
skepticism.21 I
Judges' experiential deficits act as disincentives to ameliorating
the condition of battered women. Lack of experience creates
difficulties for judges who are required to sort out conflicting ac-
counts of violence. In contested hearings, abusers underestimate the
use of violence and under-report both the frequency with which•theY
resort to violence or other controlling acts, and the gravity of any re-
sulting injuries.212
 Judges lacking personal experience with domestic
violence, without knowledge of the sociology of the autonomy of
women in relationships, often search for familiar elements as a means
to reconcile conflicting testimony.m The oft-repeated cases of women
who recount that they were battered because dinner was cold, •late,
overcooked, or undercooked, cannot be reasonably construed by
210 Martha Mahoney explains that because courts perceive women as possessing the
means to leave an abusive relationship, leaving becomes the normal response. "Once exit
is defined as the appropriate response to abuse, then staying can be treated as evidence
that abuse never happened." Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love,
Work, and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1285 (1992) [hereinafter Ma-
honey, Exit]. See also Hunter, supra note 177, at 162 (noting that judges may believe that if
the abuse was as bad as described by the victim, she would have left the relationship.
"[F]ailure to leave works against the woman's credibility; either the abuse did not occur at
all or it was not as severe as she claimed."); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered
Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 64 (1991) [hereinafter Maho-
ney, Legal Images] (noting that the law assumes that women can choose to leave although
women's choices are in fact coerced).
2" See Czapanskiy, supra note 172, at 252 (quoting a judge in a domestic violence case
who stated to the battered woman: don't believe anything that you're saying. The reason
I don't believe it is because I don't believe that anything like this could happen to me. If I
was you and someone had threatened me with a gun, there is no way that I would continue
to stay with them. There is no way that I could take that kind of abuse from diem. There-
fore, since I would not let that happen to me, I can't believe it happened to you."). A nar-
row understanding of important social issues frequently contributes to the law's injustice.
CI Yamamoto, supra note 14, at 847 (discussing the court's narrow understanding of race
and racial discrimination as one explanation for the courts' hostility toward such claims).
212 Russell P. Dobash et al., Separate and Intersecting Realties: A Compa ►ison of Men's and
Women's Accounts of Violence Against Women, 4 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 382, 395-96, 399-
400, 402-04, 407 (1998).
213 See Epstein, supra note 11, at 39 (judges are swayed by myths about domestic vio-
lence, and in particular that women have the opportunity to leave a violent relationship
when they want); Mahoney, Exit, supra note 210, at 1285. The erroneous assumptions
about domestic violence which pervade the court make it much less likely that a judge will
be willing to believe a woman's account of abuse.
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judges as stating a motive for violence against an intimate partner. 214
Judges have difficulty reconciling the testimony with their own expe-
riences and understandings.
As a result, judges seek to construct another purpose or provoca-
tion for the abuser's wrong-doing that satisfies a need for motive.
Seeking motives in such cases is problematic, because it sets up a pro-
cess of atomizing and individuation of incidents in a dynamic situa-
tion that should be understood as a complex pattern of power and
control. Motives, however, offer something legally tangible, a signpost
in an otherwise uncharted terrain with which judges reconstruct cir-
cumstances of abuse largely as cause and effect, provocation and reac-
tion. 215 The issues of the case thus assume a form recognizable to a
judge, but unreal to a battered woman.
Bias as ignorance may also transform itself into obvious discrimi-
nation against women who bring domestic violence claims to court,
manifesting itself in disrespectful and insensitive treatment.06 Gender
bias studies have documented cruel and shocking remarks made by
judges during domestic violence hearings. 217 A Georgia judge recently
ordered a defendant in a domestic violence case to take his victim out
to dinner once a week and "try to work it out."218 Another judge pon-
dered from the bench whether it was possible for a married man to
walk away without physically abusing his wife if he found her in bed
with another man.219
 Yet another judge determined that an estranged
husband's attack on his wife, from whom he had been separated for
over a year, was provoked by the fact that she had been on a camping
211 Czapanskiy, supra note 172, at 254-58.
215 See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious
Moral Error?, 69 Titx. L. REV. 1929, 1930 (1991) (arguing that judges may make serious
errors because of their inability to identify with the person whose case is before them; in-
stead, they base their decisions on their own experiences and understandings which they
assume to be neutral or truthful).
216 See Kinports & Fischer, MOW note 153, at 207.
217 See Hecht Schafran, Accounting-for Judges, supra note 177, at 1064-67; Epstein, supra
note 11, at 40 (describing demeaning comments made by judges who mistreat victims of
domestic violence such as "oh, it's you again," "how long are you going to stay this time?,"
and If you go back ... one more time, I'll hit you myself").
118 See Margaret Graham Tebo, Equal Justice, 86 A.B.A. J. 44, 44 (Sept. 2000).
215 See Hecht Schafran, supra note 177, at 1064-67; Epstein, supra note 11, at 40 (de-
scribing a Florida judge who, after hearing testimony that a man had doused his wife with
lighter fluid and set her on fire, burst into song in open court, crooning, "You light up my
wife," to the tune of "You Light Up My Life," and another case in New York where a judge
began a hearing with the comment, "Well, well, well, we had a tittle domestic squabble, did
we? Naughty, naughty. Let's kiss and make up and get out of my court.").
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trip with her boyfriend.220 Judges also punish women for crying or
displaying emotions in court: In a case in Tampa, Florida, a woman
who sought a domestic violence protection order against her es-
tranged husband (accused of raping her) was sentenced to spend a
day in the county jail after becoming emotionally overwrought and
running out of the courtroom crying because the judge refused to
grant her request for relief. 221
Bias allows judges to jettison judicial standards of decency and
resort to the "word from the underground" about the "fallacy" of do-
mestic violence claims and the lack of trustworthiness of women who
file them. 222
 Battered women's credibility is thus diminished because
they are often considered manipulators and liars intent on using the
court to achieve some wrongful purpose, such as revenge or advan-
tage in a divorce case. 223
 When a woman seeks to control the circum-
stances in which her abuser can see the children of the relationship,
she is viewed as vindictive and punitive. 224
no See Hecht Schafran, supra note 177, at 1064-67.
"I See Bill Duryea, Women's Reaction to Ruling Leads to fail, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.),
Dec. 1995, at 1A; Waits, supra note 186, at 57 (describing how crying and emotionalism
had negative affects on a judge during a domestic violence hearing).
222 See Advocating for Victims, supra note 168, at 76 (remarks of a judge assigned to do-
mestic violence cases who claimed difficulty distinguishing the really serious and true domes-
tic violence cases and apparently relied on "word from the underground" that the domes-
tic violence statute is manipulated) (emphasis added). The judge, in her panel remarks,
neither describes any cases anecdotally nor offers any data to support her confidence in
the "word from the underground" as guidance for her opinion that domestic violence
complaints are filed not because of violence but "when there is an issue of whether some-
one stays in the marital residence".
223 ?MGM, supra note 160, at 70 (noting that historical characterizations of women as
liars and manipulators who are dishonest in their claims of domestic violence have made a
comeback in recent years as evidence of a backlash against the modest gains made by the
battered woman's movement). See Dalton, supra note 196, at 366 (women are often
thought to fabricate domestic violence accusations of "manipulating the system for their
own advantage, distorting the truth," and setting out to use the domestic violence proceed-
ing as a means to leverage gain in divorce or custody proceedings. In fact, it appears there
are no empirical studies to support the allegation that women routinely fabricate stories of
abuse anywhere. Id. at 366 n.137. There are, however, studies that demonstrate the oppo-
site: that documented instances of women abusing the protective order process are rare
and, in any event, no greater than any other crimes. See Susser, supra note 159, at 883-84
(citing a study by the American Psychological Association).
224 Dalton, supra note 196, at 367; ENGLE MERRY, supra note 171, at 1,14 (observing
that courts consider plaintiffs who bring interpersonal cases to court as using the court to
fight with their lover or spouse).
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Credibility issues are critical in domestic violence cases, where a
battered woman's testimony may be the only available evidence. 225 But
her account can be affected by fear and trauma, hampering her abil-
ity to speak with clarity and force while recounting the abuse.225 Para-
doxically, if she does speak with confidence and authority, she may
appear without vulnerability and fear, without—in other words—those
traits most commonly associated with victimhood. She will not con-
form to the stereotype of a battered woman, likewise impugning the
credibility of her story in the eyes of a judge. 227
The power of bias may also insinuate itself in the invocation of
neutral rules which are implemented according to values and assump-
tions of the judge, but which are often injurious to battered wotnen. 228
ns See Alison M. Jaggar, Sexual Equality as Parity of Effective Voice, 91 CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 179, 191 (1998) (noting that women will not be listened to as a result of the phe-
nomenon of "downward social constitution" where disregard for what a person is saying is
likely to increase when "relatively privileged people are in conversation with those who
belong to what" has been categorized as "'diminished social categories,' that is to groups
that are disrespected or stigmatized." Thus, judges may listen inattentively, or interrupt, or
not respond with the seriousness that is appropriate to the person's concerns. Some sug-
gest that women have difficulty in being believed because they are regarded as "less worthy
of belief than men for the sole reason that they are women." See Kathy Mack, Continuing
Barriers to Women's Credibility: A Feminist Perspective on the Proof Process, 4 Cium. L.F. 327, 328
(1993). But see Hunter, supra note 177, at 165 (noting that not all women exhibit pow-
erless speech and that factors such as class, education, race, and ethnicity are important
factors).
2" Battered wtren who are likely to suffer from stress and fear may be affected in
their ability to provide their narrative in a variety of ways. They may speak with little affect,
in a flat or numb voice. This may be due to fear, to the fact that they are frozen with fear,
thinking of all of the threats which have been communicated to them which would come
to pass if they took the very step they have taken—told someone about the abuse—that
someone being a judge. They may actually stiffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. See
Mary Ann Dutton & Catherine L. Waltz, Domestic Violence: Understanding Why It Happens and
How to Recognize It, FAM. Anvoc. Winter 1995, at 14-18. And if their attorney seeks to ex-
plain their otherwise inappropriate demeanor, they are likely to suffer because the judge
will consider them pathological which may in turn affect the level of credibility they are
accorded and threaten their ability to gain custody. See Solender, supra note 176, at 158
(judges who come to believe that because of domestic violence, women stiffer diminished
capacity and are incapable of taking care of themselves may grant custody to the abuser).
22/ See CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 25, at 32 (noting the sexual double bind in
women's testimony. If she is emotional, she may be considered flighty and less than credi-
ble—if she is poised and in control, she does not fit the stereotype.); Mahoney, Exit, supra
note 210, at 1306 (stating that "[flaw forces upon us a discourse of victimization. Either
you are on the playing field of liberal competition, in which case you require no protec-
tion, or you prove into a category as a victim who is being kept off the field.").
228 For example, the effects of gender and gender bias on the rules of evidence have
been explored by feminist legal theorists, particularly in the difficult area of battered
women's use of self-defense. See Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Haim L.
REP. 829, 862-63 (1990) (noting that so-called neutral rules mask the political and social
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Legal procedures that appear objective and neutral are neither, when
the biases harbored by a judge are infused in their application. 229
Judges who do not understand that abusive behavior is a dynamic with
connected and controlling characteristics, and not isolated instances
of assault, may apply the evidentiary requirement of relevancy in a
fashion that precludes women from testifying about their history of
assaults. 2" Judges thereby focus on an incident of alleged physical
harm and limit testimony and evidence to a specific event or to inci-
dents which are closely related chronologically."' This is particularly
problematic if the most recent episode, prompting the request for
relief, is not the worst episode a woman has endured.232 Thus, if a
viewpoints that enter into decision-making; they hide the ideologies of judges and fail to
serve women's needs); Fenton, supra note 196, at 999 (referring to strict adherence to
abstract rules of law as formalism which operates to silence battered women); Hunter,
supra note 177; Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 416 (1991) (not-
ing the manipulation of facially neutral evidentiary rules, which are applied in ways that
take into account traditional male perspectives which harm women's interests); Marilyn
MacCrimmon, The Social Construction of Reality and the Rules of Evidence, 25 U. BRIT. COLUM.
L. REV. 36, 36 (1991),
222 See Kinports, supra note 228, at 431 (noting that whether a fact may be considered
relevant depends in part on the listener's experiences and point of view); Eric K. Yama-
moto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 341, 396 (1990) (suggesting that procedural devices are interrelated with the substan-
tive issue as well as the parties and reflect attitudes about both).
230
 In one reported case, a woman seeking a domestic violence order was prevented
from describing events considered irrelevant because they took place two years before the
most recent incident: "We're not going back that far." The woman wq granted a protec-
tion order but the judge refused to order the abuser out of the house. The victim was later
beaten to death with a baseball bat by her abuser husband in front of their 12-year old son.
See PTACEK, supra note 160, at 8 (observing that judges often narrow the focus to discrete
incidents); Naomi R. Cahn, Speaking Differences: The Rules and Relationships of Litigants' Dis-
courses, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1705, 1717 (1992) (pointing out that the determination of rele-
vant facts draws upon subjective views despite the seeming neutrality of evidentiary rules);
Kinports & Fischer, supra note 153, at 201 (pointing out that judges often refuse to allow a
pattern or history of domestic violence to be presented); Memoli & Plotino, supra note
161, at 39. In a case in North Carolina heard in February 2000, a judge determined that
violence that occurred approximately two weeks before the incident which provoked the
complainant to file for a domestic violence injunction was "too remote" to consider. (Trial
transcript on file with author).
231 See, e.g., Karen Tracy, Note, Building a Model Protective Order Process, 24 Am. j. CRIM.
L. 475, 481 (1997) (noting that in some jurisdictions, time limitations between assaults and
filing for relief are imposed to reduce court costs and, as a result, judges' understanding of
the protracted dynamics of domestic violence is distorted).
232 Many women who experience abuse do not seek protection orders after the first in-
cident, or even after egregious incidents. One reason for this is that it may not be safe for
them to do so. See Mahoney, Legal Images, supra note 210, passim (explaining separation
violence and the danger of leaving). The problem is compounded when women seek pro-
tection orders based on threats of physical abuse although state statutes authorize the
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woman waits to seek relief until a subsequent assault—one that does
not produce injuries or does not rise to a sufficient level of outrage in
the judge's perspective—she may be denied that relief because she is
precluded from testifying about a prior, more violent course of con-
duct she has experienced.233
The result is a fragmentation of testimony which distorts stories
in ways that negate the experiences of battered women and deny a
more complete understanding of gender-based violence. 2M Without
evidence documenting the history of violence and the connections
between emotional abuse, threats, and physical harm, patterns of
domestic violence rarely will be discernible. Furthermore, important
connections between battered women themselves remain obscured, 235
impeding the recognition of domestic violence as a public problem
with larger social implications, and confining it to individual idiosyn-
crasies without larger meaning. 236
C. Perpetuating the Marginalization of Domestic Violence Claims
Flawed and biased judicial processes and decision-making
mechanisms coalesce to form a cultural system with structures and
practices that marginalize domestic violence in the courts. 237 These
mechanisms may reproduce themselves in ways that are not overtly
discriminatory, and that produce negative results unintentionally, but
granting of such orders where there have been threats unaccompanied with actual physical
violence. In such instances, where threats are lodged, even where there has been prior
violence, the absence of immediately recent violence may defeat a claim for relief. See Kin-
ports & Fischer, supra note 153, at 190-91 (noting that threats of shooting or stabbing
where there has been past violence is still not sufficient to obtain a civil protection order).
233 See Kinports & Fischer, supra note 153, at 190 (observing that some judges will dis-
tinguish between whether a batterer's fist was open or closed in deciding whether to grant
relief).
234 See Kinports, supra note 228, at 419-30 (providing a feminist critique of the law of
evidence as a whole). .
233 See Hunter, supra note 177, at 131 (noting that "the decontextualized examination
of disaggregated incidents can leave a case in shreds"); Yamamoto, supra note 229, at 396.
236 Cf Bandes, supra note 200, at 1318 (describing the ways in which claims of police
brutality are reshaped by the court as detached incidents. According to Bandes, this makes
claims of government misconduct less threatening and easier to dismiss than if the pat-
terns and coherent structure were revealed in court).
237 ENGLE MERRY, supra note 171, at 577 (law as culture is expressed as practices and
systems). See John MConley & William M. O'Barr, Crime And Custom in Corporate Society: A
Cultural Perspective on Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. Pitons. 5; 9 (1997) (noting
a cultural theory stating that shared beliefs and practices that comprise culture can take on
a life of their own, ultimately dictating the day-to-day behavioral choices of its constitu-
ents).
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they nevertheless perpetuate the inferior legal status of these cases.
For example, bureaucratic responses and administrative adaptations,
shaped by a discourse and practice that devalue these claims, may di-
minish the effectiveness of recourse to the court system even as that
system attempts, in good faith, to respond to the growing number of
domestic violence litigants. Similarly, lawyers who handle domestic
violence claims may unwittingly conform their conduct and practices
to the constricted culture of domestic violence law, thereby contribut-
ing to and reinforcing it unintentionally.
These cultural practices may be insulated from correction by
their very consequences within and outside of the judicial system: The
subordination of domestic violence in the courts prevents education
of the trial judge, who hears, at best, a disaggregated version of events.
When civil domestic violence proceedings are limited at the trial level,
so too are the opportunities for a transformation in the law that might
occur if these claims were allowed to be presented fully, for the devel-
opment of appellate law is hindered as wel1. 238 The result is that indi-
vidual cases may be predictably doomed, and there is diminished
hope of elevating domestic violence cases, as a group, to the class of
respected legal claims. 2" At the same time, in and out of the courts
there is evidence of a backlash toward battered women based on a
perception that they have an unfair advantage and play on public
sympathy.240 Moreover, increased attention to domestic violence has
resulted in unfounded assumptions about progress in the courts and
has produced skepticism, if not outright denial, that serious problems
persist, making needed reforms all the more difficult to achieve.
1. Structural Designs and Limitations
The increase in requests for orders of protection, which has re-
sulted largely from the passage of remedial statutes and the successes
of the battered women's movement in educating the public, has
tended to bureaucratize the judicial response to domestic violence. 241
Standardized forms are available from court clerks who often assist in
their completion. 292
 Lay advocates are sometimes available in the
2" See Yamamoto, supra note 14, at 886 (noting that court hearings have the potential
to be "cultural performances, events that produce transformations in socio-cultural prac-
tices and in consciousness").
228 See Kinports & Fischer, supra note 153, at 214-15.
240 PrAcEit, supra note 160, at 70; see Dalton, supra note 196, at 366.
241 PTACEK, supra note 160, at 69.
20 HART, supra note 150, at 7, 9.
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court to assist battered women. 243 These changes are often designed
to allow women greater efficiency in accessing the courts without the
need for attorneys, while providing some assistance to make the court
experience less frightening.
But increased efficiency does not necessarily produce increased
justice. 244 The use of standardized forms containing boilerplate lan-
guage frequently limits the ability of women to explain their case. 245
Complicated patterns of abuse are reduced to a box-checking format
that eviscerates meaning from the content of the domestic violence
experience. Although such forms facilitate access to court, a plaintiffs
ability to substantiate her claims is undermined by the use of pre-
printed allegations that inherently discourage pleading claims with
specificity. 246 Lawyers generally use these forms as well, and, in the
process, fail to recount their client's full story in a cornplaint. 247 This
is particularly problematic in domestic violence cases where there is
no discovery and little opportunity for persuasion. Thus, although the
complaint is one of the principal means for communicating any
claim, it is difficult to use for that purpose in cases of domestic vio-
lence. 248
Form orders are also available to judges in domestic violence
matters. The uniformity of these orders is useful to law enforcement
agencies who enter them in databases for enforcement purposes. But
the forms inhibit the development of findings of fact and conclusions
of law.249 Judges indicate their decision in these cases by checking a
243 Id. at 11-12.
244 See Yamamoto, supra note 229, at 352.
245 See Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litiga-
tors, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 772 (1995) (noting the importance for civil rights lawyers to "go
beyond the boilerplates, which do not lend themselves to portraying the unique position
of their clients, who are socially marginalized underdogs").
246 See, e.g., Buda v. Humble, 517 N.W.2d 622, 625 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994) (order of pro-
tection granted but then reversed because the plaintiff's adoption of preprinted allega-
tions was found to be too general to support a finding).
247 See Eastman, supra note 245, at 768-69 (observing that pleadings which once were
considered "the quintessence of the law" have been "worn down by waves of reform to
simplicity and plainness" yet still maintain great importance).
248 See infra note 369 and accompanying text.
242 See, e.g., Price v. Price, 514 S.E.2d 553, 554 n.2 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (reversal for
failure to enter findings of facts and conclusions of law. The court of appeals noted that
the form order was used and included several boxes, and that it was useful to accommo-
date the large number of domestic violence cases, but that the trial court should not ne-
glect its responsibility to make necessary findings and conclusions); Mechtel v. Mechtel,
528 N.W.2d 916, 921 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that court, which relied on pre-
printed forms, erred in failing to make findings of fact).
1128	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 42:1081
box, with little attention to the unique details in a particular case.
This, in turn, diminishes the impact of the court's message on the de-
fendant, and may actually create enforcement problems. 25° It also may
result in an order which is difficult to sustain on appeal. 251
The creation of specialized domestic violence courts represents
another administrative response to the increase in domestic violence
claims.252
 The development of these integrated courts, designed to
handle all aspects of domestic violence matters, is generally motivated
by both organizational convenience and genuine interest in improv-
ing the court process.253
 But the efficacy of these courts in improving
judicial outcomes is not altogether clear. 254 Some studies indicate that
officials who work in specialized courts are just as likely to implement
the law half-heartedly as their counterparts in courts of broader juris-
diction.255
 In addition, specialized courts are not immune from the
problem of gender bias. 256 Furthermore, they have been reported to
expose women to an increased risk of being charged with failure to
protect their children from the batterer's abuse. 257
Finally, although domestic violence cases present unique prob-
lems and may require enhanced training and courtroom safety pre-
cautions, a separate court for domestic violence claims isolates them
from other legal claims and suggests that they are not only different,
but also less important. 258
 The existence of special courts may excuse
or discourage other judges from undertaking any training, notwith-
is) See David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Overview, 17 T.M. COOLEY L REV. 125,
128 (2000) (noting difficulty in achieving compliance with court orders where judges fail
to clearly formulate their terms).
257
 Brandon v. Brandon, 513 S.E.2d 589,655 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (civil order of pro-
tection overturned on appeal due to the failure of the trial court to make findings).
252
 Some of these courts focus on criminal intervention as opposed to civil cases. See
Tsai, supra note 173, at 1296; see also Susan K. Knipps & Greg Berman, New York's Problem-
Solving Courts Provide Meaningful Alternatives to Traditional Remedies, 72 June N.Y. ST. Bj. 8,9
(2000).
255
 See Knipps & Berman, supra note 252, at 9; Tsai, supra note 173, at 1296; see also Ep-
stein, supra note 11, at 28-29.
254 See Epstein, supra note 11, at 46 (noting that in one study in the District of Colum-
bia, despite the creation of a specialized domestic violence court, the percentage of do-
mestic violence injunctions issued in contested cases decreased).
255 Pearson, supra note 168, at 1311-12.
256 Id. at 1312.
257
 See Epstein, supra note 11, at 5,34.
255 See Fine, supra note 122, at 298 (noting that while a separate court system offers
administrative convenience, unique treatment sends the message that domestic violence is
in some way different from "normal" legal issues and reduces the effectiveness of legal
intervention).
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standing the fact that domestic violence issues are likely to appear in a
variety of legal causes and claims.259 These courts may become overly
routinized, placing emphasis on efficiency and speed. 26° Ultimately,
special domestic violence courts may be an administrative expedience
with the net effect of further stigmatizing domestic violence cases. 261
Both standardized forms and specialized domestic violence
courts may be seen as well-intended developments which have had the
unforeseen consequence of informalizing domestic violence proceed-
ings instead of ensuring serious legal consideration. Domestic vio-
lence claims, particularly where judges perceive them as being han-
dled by clerks and lay advocates, are reduced to quasi-legal
experiences which reinforce the legal system's propensity to prevent
them from being presented as formal legal claims at all. The potential
benefits of these reforms are often undermined by systemic opera-
tional and cultural failures in the legal system's treatment of domestic
violence claims. Without a transformation in the culture of the law,
the legal system remains fraught with risks for battered women, giving
rise to skepticism about the value and purpose of these new develop-
ments, and demanding ongoing scrutiny of them.
2. The Effect on Lawyers
The subordinated legal culture of domestic violence claims is
likely to influence lawyers' conduct. 262 The belief that time constraints
in the courts' area factor in the perfunctory treatment given these
issues may cause attorneys to present abridged versions of their cases.
Attorneys often waive opening or closing statements or limit the
number of witnesses in an effort to fit the case within the "five min-
utes and forty-five seconds" allotted to the entire proceeding. 263 At-
torneys also withhold requests for certain forms of relief for fear of
angering judges 264 Judicial indications of the low importance of these
259 See Hecht Schafran, supra note 177, at 1078-79; Deborah Goelman & Roberta Va-
lente, When Will They Ever Learn, Educating to End Domestic Violence A Law School Report, ABA
Commissiox ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, passim (1997) (noting the potential intersection of
domestic violence issues with almost all other areas of the law).
ft° See Epstein, supra note 11, at M.
"1 See Fine, supra note 122, at 298-99.
462 See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468,486 (1990).
222 See Memoli & Plotino, supra note 161, at 47.
2" O'Sullivan, supra note 164, at 65,78 (noting that some attorneys indicated that they
do not request a denial of visitation despite the danger to a woman and her children in
order to avoid risking the anger of a judge).
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cases create disincentives for writing briefs. 265
 Without opening or
dosing arguments, without facts or legal theories, the court is given
little to interpret.266
 These deterrents reduce the opportunities to
practice the kind of law that might otherwise elevate the treatment of
domestic violence cases on par with other civil cases. They also dimin-
ish the opportunity to educate judges about domestic violence issues.
The marginalization of domestic violence cases often affects at-
torneys' perceptions of the nature of their work. 267
 Even legal services
attorneys who most frequently represent domestic violence victims
exhibit an attitude discounting these cases as routine "service" cases
rather than complex "impact" litigation. 268 Pro bono attorneys are of-
ten reluctant to handle domestic violence, or any family law, mat-
ters. 269
 They too are affected by the low status assigned to these
claims.2" When they do agree to handle domestic violence cases as
part of their pro bono responsibilities, they are often lured by assur-
ances that cases will be disposed of quickly, and that any related cus-
tody, visitation, or child support matters will be handled in separate
proceedings."'
266 Kinports & Fischer, supra note 153, at 214-15 (noting that abbreviated hearings de-
ter consideration in the making of an appellate record).
268 See Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 577 (1992) (sug-
gesting that interpretation as a critical function of the courts is unlikely to occur without
the stages of a trial including openings, summation, the presentation of evidence and legal
argument). Without presentation of facts and the opportunity to interpret them, judges
have little or no opportunity to make determinations that will help either the individual
claimant or those like her. See John Frazier Jackson, The Brandeis Brief—Too Little, Too Late:
The Thal Court as a Superior Foram for Presenting Legislative Facts, 17 Ass. J. TRIAL. Anvoc. 1, 1
(1993) (discussing the judicial decision-making process where judges can make policy as
"shopping for facts").
567 See Dalton, supra note 196, at 367 (noting attorney reluctance to handle these mat-
ters and hostility toward these claims).
266
 "Service" and "impact" work are terms that refer to the alleged division between
categories of cases traditionally, handled by legal services programs. Service work refers to
the individual and perhaps more routine case; impact work refers to those cases that, ei-
ther through class action mechanisms or a more complicated set of facts and circum-
stances, seek systemic relief applicable to many people. Although it is acknowledged that
this paradigm is a consistently useful description, it nonetheless represents a hierarchy of
work within legal services. See Margulies, supra note 139, at 1071-72, 1089-90 (noting the
neglect of domestic violence issues by legal services and poverty law scholars who fall trap
to the public/private distinction).
269 See Dalton, supra note 196, at 367 (suggesting that some lawyers, if given the
chance, would prefer not to represent victims of domestic violence).
470 Id.; see Cahn, supra note 22, at 1114 (noting that historically, family law has been de-
valued in theory and practice and remains devalued in the courts).
271
 A common model for pro bono arrangements with legal services programs or law
school advocacy programs is to request that private attorneys handle the protection order
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Nor are lawyers immune from the myth of the manipulative
woman pursuing a vindictive domestic violence claim. 272 This may be
due, in part, to the construction of evidentiary obstacles, either by the
dynamic of domestic violence or by operational failures within court
processes, which cause attorneys to focus only on that part of the bat-
tered woman's narrative which they may expect to be admissible. 273 As
a result, lawyers may hear a disaggregated story which affects their
understanding of the issues and impairs the credibility of their clients.
In addition, attorneys, like judges, may have difficulty believing ac-
counts of events beyond the realm of their personal experiences. 274
This cannot but affect efforts to achieve justice for their battered
women clients.
3. Restricting the Development of Domestic Violence Law
Judges who circumscribe the presentation of domestic violence
cases are likely to remain uninformed about the dimensions of the
problem, and they experience difficulty recognizing the relationship
of domestic violence to other areas of the law. Because legal proceed-
ings serve as a forum for the expression of community values and of-
fer a venue for testing beliefs and reexamining and developing social
norms, the absence of legal dialogue that deprives battered women of
the opportunity to present their stories all but precludes the possibil-
ity of a sympathetic legal response that would influence the outcome
of their claims.
Perfunctory treatment of civil cases at the trial level, moreover,
results in limited hearings and undeveloped factual records such that
proceedings without regard to custody, visitation, or child support. These matters are re-
ferred to organized legal services programs. This arrangement through discursive and
legal practice bifurcates relief proceedings and implies that protection orders which
openly contain "stay away" or no "further assault provisions" are effective. Interview with
Ann Piccarti, former Pro Bono Coordinator, Bay Area Legal Services, Tampa, Florida, and
Debbie Segal, former Executive Director, Atlanta Volunteer Lawyers Foundation (stating
that pro bono attorneys who may be willing to undertake representation in protection
order cases are reluctant to accept any contested custody matters). See also Survey re-
sponses from domestic violence attorneys with legal services of North Carolina. (Notes and
responses on file with author).
"2 See Hecht Schafran, supra note 209, at 905 (describing difficulties male attorneys
have believing their clients in related matters).
275 See supra notes 225-236 and accompanying text.
274 See Hecht Schafran, supra note 209, at 405 (describing a male attorney's confession
that he had a difficult time believing his client's sexual harassment claim, "confusing [her]
desperate cries for justice with hysteria"); Hunter, supra note 177, at 162.
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the possibility of appellate decisions is reduced. 275 Few indeed is the
number of appellate decisions arising out of appeals filed by women
denied adequate relief. 278 The dearth of appellate cases is all the more
ironic in light of the claim that domestic violence cases congest the
courts: The small number of civil appellate decisions are typically
generated by defendants who have appealed the issuance of an order
against them. 277
The failure to obtain relief results in formidable obstacles to ap-
peals. A woman denied an emergency or ex parte order for relief may
not appeal that interlocutory decision.278
 Denied relief at the initial
stages of the lawsuit, it is unlikely that she will continue to pursue a
final order from which an appeal could be taken. 27° A final hearing at
which a skeletal "stay away" order is granted, but which lacks custody
relief, may produce no record.28° Battered women who appear pro se
are unlikely to take cognizance of the procedural requirements for a
record. Even when women are represented by attorneys, the abbrevi-
ated domestic violence process results in a lack of proper concern for
the record.
Without the presentation of evidence and law, and without qual-
ity fact-finding at the trial level, the opportunity to promote the de-
velopment of the law through appellate review is all the more
difficult. The appellate process benefits from the upward transport of
fully explored factual and legal claims. The denial of opportunities to
develop appellate law has far-reaching consequences. The prospects
for the improvement of the quality of future lower court procedures
and decisions are diminished, as are the prospects of elevating the
status of domestic violence matters as legal claims. Any likelihood of
changing the legal culture concerning domestic violence suffers
commensurately.
275
 Kinports & Fischer, supra note 153, at 215 (noting that abbreviated hearings deter
consideration with the making of an appellate record).
276 See infra note 349 and accompanying text.
277 Id. One study noted that the few appeals that are hied are more likely to involve the
abuser challenging the issuance of the order than the petitioner appealing its denial. Kin-
ports & Fischer, supra note 153, at 214-15.
va See Kinports & Fischer, supra note 153, at 215.
272 Id.
280 Id.
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4. Progress and the Masking of Inequalities
Denial that battered women face difficulties in the courts persists,
despite heightened awareness of the problem. 281 Ironically, this denial
is related to increased attention to, and awareness of, domestic vio-
lence issues. As a social problem, domestic violence has gained wide-
spread publicity. 282 Newspaper editorials praise legislative efforts to
toughen laws against domestic violence and new policies enhance law
enforcement responses. Studies report the deterrent effects of man-
datory arrest, pro arrest, no-drop policies, and other devices that in-
crease sanctions against domestic violence offenders. 288
Much of the legal response to domestic violence has been in the
form of criminal law remedies. 284 Criminal remedies, however, must
be distinguished from civil relief, because criminal remedies are not
always responsive to the needs of battered wornen. 288 They do not
provide women with the resources to establish secure lives with their
children at home, at the workplace, or in their communities. 286
Moreover, attention to criminal remedies actually contributes to
skepticism that battered women continue to face difficulties in the
courts.287 In fact, the contention that gender inequality persists is met
with incredulity. 288 Deborah Rhode notes that social scientists who
demonstrate the prevalence of the problem of domestic violence are
281 For a comprehensive overview of the persistent denial of gender inequality, see
generally RHODE, supra note 194.
282 See id. at 3.
288 See Lawrence W. Sherman, The Influence of Criminology on Criminal Law: Evaluating
Arrests for Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 831 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 ( 1992).
284 See Jeffrey Fagan, The Criminalization of Domestic Violence: Promises and Limits, in SE-
RIES: NI,' RESEARCH }Worm, Washington, D.C. (1996) (discussing the proliferation of
criminal intervention strategies and the research that describes them and commenting
that little research has focused on civil remedies).
888 Mills, supra note 11, passim.
"6 In fact, improved civil outcomes may reduce the need for intervention by the
criminal justice system. See Epstein, supra note 11, at 19-20 (citing a study which demon-
strated that the types of relief afforded by full and complete civil protection orders which
provide resources and conditions for escaping abusive relationships are what often reduces
a battered woman's reliance on the criminal justice system).
887 See Sassier, supra note 122, at 1159-64. Basster argues, for example, that notwith-
standing the VAWA findings that state systems routinely failed battered women, no federal
remedy was needed because of the adequacy of state remedies, specifically noting the civil
protection order scheme. Id.
288 See RHODE, supra note 194, at 108 (documenting persistent denial of gender ine-
quality in the courts and the "countercurrent of ... denial").
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described in the media as alarmists and exaggerators. 289 Claims that
domestic violence cases suffer in the courts are received with disbelief
and dismissal, and are met with a view that women have undeserved
advantages. 29°
The appearance of progress can lead to complacency and create
barriers to future progress.291
 Actual failures are both masked and ex-
acerbated by reforms shaped by and implemented at the margins of
the legal system. New laws are passed, leading to the assumption that
the problems have been . addressed.292 The challenge is to recognize
and support those reforms that genuinely provide battered women
meaningful support, while at the same time expose formalities of re-
form that neither improve conditions for battered women nor permit
further change.
D. Examining Outcomes: Consequencefar Battered Women
The legal system's operational failures are experienced most
acutely by battered women who are denied relief. The harm they suf-
fer is not simply an encounter with a system that devalues their claims,
but the outcome of such an encounter as well. The marginalization of
these claims exacerbates the already dangerous situation for battered
women, because it makes them unable to gain meaningful access to
an important institution where values are communicated. 293 A de-
scription of the negative outcomes suffered by the large class of peo-
ple whose claims are marginalized serves to refute the Court's asser-
tion in Morrison that no "civilized system of justice could fail to
provide ... a remedy" to victims of gender-based violence. 294 Indeed,
such an examination suggests a lack of a civilized system of justice.
R89 Id. at 108. This is true despite the fact that much of the data comes from the
American Medical Association, the U.S. Surgeon General, and the Department of Justice.
Id.
299 Id. at 3.
221 Id. at 14 (noting that the successes of the women's movement have undercut the
urgency of further reforms).
292 Id. at 16.
293 See Florentino P. Feliciano, The Application of Law: Some Recurring Aspects of the Process
of Judicial Review and Decision-Making, 37 Am. J. Joins. 17, 47-48 (1992). Cf. Juan F. Perea,
Hernandez v. New York: Courts, Prosecutors, and the Fear of Spanish, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 54
(1992) (noting that courts create identities through the law).
294
 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
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1. Endangering Women's Lives
The marginalization of domestic violence claims has dire conse-
quences for battered women. Most immediately, women denied effec-
tive protection from violence are placed in a dangerous situation.
While protection orders do not fully eliminate gender-based violence
and, of course, rarely offer foolproof guarantees, they do seem to re-
duce the number of violent incidents. 295 Women who obtain civil pro-
tection orders that both enjoin further contact by the abuser, and sta-
bilize their custody situations with resources adequate to support their
independence, are more likely to appeal to legal solutions, should
they need them, in the future. 296
A woman is endangered when a judge treats her request for a
hearing as spiteful and wasteful of the court's time. Under these cir-
cumstances, the court's stance is hardly distinguishable from the
abuser's. The denial of relief to a battered woman often emboldens
her abuser who, persuaded that the law will not intervene, is encour-
aged to act with a new sense of impunity. 297 Acts of violence thus go
unpunished, and the belief that the woman somehow deserves the
treatment she receives is validated by the court. 298
Judges who refuse to adjudicate custody claims in domestic vio-
lence proceedings, and who instead require women to file separate
divorce or custody proceedings, create risky situations. Women are
endangered by the delays that result from such bifurcated proceed-
ings, and they often cannot afford attorneys to bring custody ac-
tions—which are much more difficult to negotiate pro se. 299 Further-
more, orders resulting from custody or divorce actions are not likely
sus PTACEK, supra note 160, at 164 (86% of women surveyed said that their domestic
violence protection order either stopped or reduced the abuse).
Rg° Linda G. Mills, The Case Against Mandatory State Interventions: A Reply to Evan Stark, in
6 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORT 1, 14 (Oct./Nov. 2000) (noting that battered women are
less likely to tolerate domestic violence when they receive the kind of support that enables
them to move forward).
297 See ENGLE MERRY, supra note 171, at 3 (describing the risks of resorting to the
courts where women may further enrage their husbands or lovers by going to court but
being unsuccessful in their ability to get protection); Dalton, supra note 196, at 366.
298 See PTACEK, supra note 160, at 110-11 (pointing out that the attitude of the judge is
apparent to both parties and has implications for both).
299 Almost every state statute provides that civil protection orders are remedies that are
in addition to other civil and criminal remedies. Klein & Orloff, supra note 15, at 895. See
THE FAMILY VIOLENCE DEPARTMENT OF THE NATIONAL COUNSEL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY
COURT JUDGES, FAMILY VIOLENCE: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE (1990) (noting that bat-
tered women should use any and all legal remedies without having to choose between
them).
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to be as effective as a custody provision that is part of a domestic vio-
lence injunction, the violation of which triggers an immediate law en-
forcement response with far more substantial repercussions."'"
Without full presentation of the evidence, judges may jeopardize
battered women and their children by making rulings which reflect
only a partial and distorted understanding of the consequences of
domestic violence. Thus, women who frequently relocate from place
to place to avoid harassment may be penalized in custody hearings for
appearing unstable."' Abbreviated hearings in which women are de-
nied the opportunity to explain the effects of domestic violence may
result in batterers getting custody, even though they may be the very
cause of this apparent instability. 302
It is often dangerous, and always difficult, for women to seek pro-
tection orders, but those who opt for relief have determined that the
greater peril lies without a protection order. 303 The request for a do-
mestic violence injunction is frequently a measure of last resort, evi-
dencing the despair engendered by the kind of violence and manipu-
lation that limits a woman's ability to be self-sufficient and to exercise
personal independence. 304
 A battered woman is likely to be in a
weaker economic and physical position than her abuser, and is thus
hindered in her ability to deal with violence without legal assis-
tance.305
 Simply put, she desperately desires and needs help from the
law.
The failures of the legal system are not easily remedied else-
where. Some solutions can only be achieved through the formal acts
of the legal system. The courts alone have the legal power to reduce
the ability of an abuser to do physical harm or to make threats. 306
300
 Most domestic violence statutes mandate special police protection and enforce-
ment; orders are kept on file with police officers, and violations can result in warrantless
arrests, simplifying police tasks and resulting in faster enforcement. In contrast, civil con-
tempt remedies for violation of a custody or divorce order are less effective in keeping a
woman and her children safe. See HART supra note 150, at 11,19-20 (noting police regis-
tries for orders of protection and arrest provisions for violations).
"I See Solender supra note 176, at 158 (noting that judges will give custody of the chil-
dren to the abuser if they believe the victim has become "incapable of fending for her-
self') .
902 Id.; Waits, supra note 196, at 58.
ws PrAcER, supra note 160, at 145.
3°4 See ENGLE MERRY, supra note 171, at 16 (noting that people who bring "interper-
sonal cases" to court are often desperate because all other efforts have failed and there are
no alternatives).
3" Id. at 62-63.
PrAcEtt, supra note 160, at 6.
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Only the courts can order a person to vacate a residence, award cus-
tody, and determine conditions for visitation or order child sup-
port."7 The court's response may immediately diminish the possibility
of continued abuse as well as influence choices made by battered
women as to how best protect themselves in the future."
Battered women with children are exposed to a threat of another
sort when they are discouraged from seeking court intervention in
domestic violence proceedings. If they do not seek to protect their
children from domestic violence, they risk accusations of child abuse
or neglect." They face the prospect of state intervention in another
type of legal proceeding—one that they have not initiated and cannot
control. When raised in a legal proceeding initiated by a battered
woman, incidents that may have been considered by the court to be a
burdensome private family dispute are transformed into quasi-
criminal acts, and the resources of the state may be marshaled against
her. The legal mechanisms of failure in domestic violence claims pun-
ish a battered woman who has acted against the violence, even as she
is simultaneously blamed for appearing to have taken no action.51 °
2. Antitherapeutic Outcomes and Procedural justice
The indifference with which domestic violence claims typically
are treated affects women beyond the potential deficiencies of a court
order.311 In domestic violence matters, the law has the potential to
3°7 Id.
3°8 Id. at 120 (citing several studies demonstrating that institutional responses to
women's efforts to seek relief can 'have significant impact on how women define future
strategies to protect themselves).
909 G. Kristian Miccio, A Reasonable Battered Mother?: Redefining. Reconstructing, and Recre-
ating the Battered Mother in Child Protective Proceedings, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S U. 89, 89, 91-92
(1991) (noting that the state blames the mother for failure to protect the children when
there is domestic violence in the home while the state's own inaction and failure/refusal to
intervene to protect her becomes irrelevant).
310 Id. at 91-92.
3" The study of therapeutic jurisprudence examines the law as a social force which
may shape therapeutic or anti-therapeutic outcomes. See generally David Wexler, supra note
250; David B. Wexler, Therapeutic justice and the Culture of Critique, 101 CONTEMP. LEGAL
IssuEs, 263 (1999); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic jurisprudence in A Comparative Law Context,
15 BEHAV. SC1. & L., 233 (1997); David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health
Law—Therapeutic jurisprudence, 16 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 1 (1992); Bruce J. Win ick, The juris-
prudence of Therapeutic jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL. Pus. Poir & L. 184 (1997). For an over-
view of therapeutic jurisprudence as applied to domestic violence, see Simon, supra note
153. Theories about procedural justice describe both the instrumental and normative per-
spectives of the law's ability to obtain consensus about resolution of disputes and to inspire
compliance with the law. Seegetura/5/ Tom R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
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serve as a therapeutic agent in helping to restore emotional well-
being and physical safety to battered women. 312
 Many battered women
are beset by self-blame and shame. They have repeatedly been told by
their abusers that no one will believe them. The very act of seeking
court intervention demonstrates a woman's determination to chal-
lenge that message. Perfunctory justice denies battered women the
benefits of the impartial but authoritative judicial recognition that
they have suffered harm. 515
Victims of domestic violence who seek orders of protection are
not only asking for an acknowledgment of the wrong to which they
have been subjected, they are also asking for a forum where they can
be heard and confront their abusers. 314
 When the process affords vic-
tims procedural fairness, including participation, dignity, and a sense
of trust, the court process is transformed into a value unto itself. 315
The validation of a battered woman's claim is then an "inescapable by-
product" of judicial process and review of the problem. 316
 Within the
enclave of the public courthouse, a battered woman may experience a
redistribution of power in her favor. 317
 Marginalization of her claim,
however, destroys this opportunity. Judicial conduct which under-
mines her efforts confirms an outcome predicted by the abuser and
denies any transformative possibility.318
312
 Id. at 62. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence in A Comparative Law Context, supra note
311, at 233-46.
313 See Nathalie Des Rosiers et al., Legal Compensation for Sexual Violence: Therapeutic Con-
sequences and Consequences for the Judicial System, 4 Psvcitcn.. Nu. POLY & L. 433, 440 (1998)
("It is through the words and behavior of the adjudicator that the survivors seem to seek
society's acknowledgment of the harm.").
314 See Cahn, supra note 230, at 1710 (reviewing John Conley and William O'Barr's
findings that litigants, even if they win, will be dissatisfied if they don't get to tell their
story); Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendant's Evaluation of Their Courtroom
Experience, 18 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 51, 67 (1984) (noting responses to questions about per-
ceptions of fairness in the handling of their cases; 26% of the respondents noted having
the opportunity to present evidence; followed by 12% who stated the judge's manner and
12% who noted the nature of the outcome received).
313
 Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 39,
63 (1994) (noting the process concerns include participation, dignity and trust).
313
 Feliciano, supra note 293, at 32.
317
 In a study of the civil claims of victims of sexual violence, the findings demonstrated
that women want more than monetary damages. See Des Rosiers et al., supra note 313, at
433. The opportunity to confront the perpetrator was essential to producing a positive
outcome. Id. at 443. In the judicial setting, the survivors experienced a sense of control of
the interaction, and thus more of the power. Id. at 437, 444.
318
 Subordination of domestic violence claims may have a negative affect on the ac-
tions and attitudes of abusers and deny them benefits that derive from full and fair proc-
esses. Judges who engage in a courtroom discourse and render a decision which affirms
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Civil protection orders offer the possibility of providing resources
and safety to battered women and their children. But treating these
claims as unworthy of the courts' time results in contorted outcomes
for victims. The mechanisms that produce these results must be un-
derstood, and judges and attorneys should be required to maintain
heightened vigilance to eradicate their effects. Without this commit-
ment, domestic violence will remain categorized as quasi-legal and
trivial family disputes, thereby obscuring the need to consider issues
that can be resolved only through attitudinal, structural and cultural
changes to the legal system.
III. MOVING FORWARD IN THE SPHERE OF LEGAL PRACTICE
The difficulties described in VAWA's legislative compromises, to-
gether with the United States v. Morrison decision, and the perfunctory
treatment of domestic violence claims in state courts, underscore what
Naomi Cahn has described as the "tension between theory and prac-
tice [that] stems from the inevitable, and important questions about
whether the legal process can meaningfully address women's
needs." For battered women, the legal process reveals debilitating
inadequacies and exacts a cost on those who appeal to the law in pur-
suit of legal redress. The courts are the authoritative institutions
"where most of the activities making up social life within ... society
simultaneously are represented, contested, and inverted." 320 Thus,
that an abuser's behavior is illegal and incompatible with public values may impact that
individual and motivate him to reconsider his behavior. See Kinports & Fischer, supra note
154, at 208; Simon, supra note 153, at 58 (suggesting that a therapeutic approach to do-
mestic violence matters offers the possibility of cognitive therapy to a batterer whereby he
is confronted with his "faulty thinking"). Similarly, an abuser, like the battered woman,
should be allowed to participate, must be treated with dignity, and his rights, along with
those of the battered woman, must be acknowledged. See Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological
Consequences ofJudicial Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV.
433, 439 (1992). Fair process may enhance his respect for the law, affect his behavior and
encourage compliance with the law, See TYLER, supra note 314, at 57 (noting that proce-
dural justice provides a sense of legitimacy about the law which is likely to encourage peo-
ple to obey the law). Furthermore, women may also be endangered if they get domestic
violence orders without the court allowing an evidentiary hearing, as such orders may be
subject to appeal and reversal. See, e.g., Erhart v. Erhart, 776 S.W.2d 450, 450, 451 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997); Elstun v. Elstun, 600 N.W.2d 835, 840 (Neb. 1999); Muldrew v. Mixon, 654
N.Y.S.2d 912, 912 (App. Div. 1997); Miller v. Miller, 875 P.2d 1195, 1196 (Or. Ct. App.
1994); Lewis v. Lewis, 689 So.2d 1271, 1273 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
515 Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in
Theory and Practice, 77 CORNELL L. Rev. 1398, 1398 (1992).
3" Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milian, Tiwnslating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The
Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L. J. 625, 628 (1990).
1140	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 42:1081
those who remain excluded from the courts' domain suffer loss of
dignity and power.
Despite the tenacity of historical beliefs and long-held miscon-
ceptions, an ongoing challenge to misguided values and practices
within the courts is necessary in order to adapt legal culture to shift-
ing social paradigms. 32' An examination of VAWA's demise and an in-
vestigation of the marginalization of domestic violence in state courts
promises useful insights into court practices, and thus may assist in
challenging the status quo. 322
 This is not to suggest that gender-based
violence will be eliminated by reliance on the legal process. 323 But le-
gal culture insinuates itself into other social and political processes,
just as the consequences of operational failures inside the courtroom
have repercussions outside of it.324
 The challenge is to make the legal
system responsive to social needs, and to use an improved legal cul-
ture to change society.
A. Pursuing Legal Solutions in State Courts
The legal culture that shapes the behavior of federal and state
courts produces the assumptions that contribute to the marginaliza-
don of domestic violence claims. Each court system responds to de-
velopments in the other. 323
 As noted in Part II, for example, the Morri-
son decision was influenced by local court practices. It follows that
obtaining improved processes in state courts, without abandoning the
pursuit of federal remedies, could improve the future disposition of
federal courts to adjudicate gender-based violence claims. 326
The VAWA legislative process and its subsequent demise should
serve as inspiration for efforts to transform legal culture. The strate-
gies that contributed to the Act's short-lived success provided infor-
321 See Barbara Yngvesson, Inventing Law in Local Settings: Rethinking Popular Legal Cul-
ture, 98 YALE U. 1689, 1693 (1989) (noting that the invention of the law is not a one-way
process but is affected by those who struggle to use it).
322 See Yamamoto, supra note 14, at 834-35 (noting the need to translate critical legal
theory into practical concepts for political lawyers).
32' See Kevin R. Johnson, Lawyering for Social Change: What's A Lawyer To Do?, 5 Mimi.
RACE & L. 201, 205-06 (1999) (warning about the limits of litigation and the need to look
beyond the courtroom in order to achieve social change).
324 See Engle Merry, supra note 24, at 578 (describing law as a cultural system that can
be imposed on other cultural systems).
35 Id. (noting that legal procedures expressed at either the local or national level bear
on one another).
326 See Resnik, supra note 27, at 1006 (noting the possibility of shared and overlapping
work between state and federal courts).
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mation useful for educating courts so they may reconceptualize do-
mestic violence as an important and public matter. 327 Particular atten-
tion should be given to state courts, for this venue cannot be aban-
doned without prejudicial consequences on the claitns of women who
seek remedies for gender-based violence. Further, because their state
court claims now, necessarily, serve as the principal vehicle for re-
forming the legal culture, micro-level strategies to improve the use of
state courts on behalf of battered women have the greatest potential
and urgency.328
Multiple perspectives are required in order to change legal cul-
ture in the state courts. Awareness of the theoretical terrain and of
critical legal insights complements the legal strategies of practitioners.
When these perspectives are joined in the context of real-world expe-
riences of battered women litigants, practical guidance for improving
conditions in the courts may emerge. This approach offers promising
possibilities; it goes beyond pronouncements about the need for
change and identifies the conditions for creating change. In the pro-
cess, battered women and their advocates can endeavor to define le-
gal justice by giving it content, rather than just reference to the law. 329
B. Framing Legal Projects: Prescription for Change
I. The Characteristics of Transformative Strategies
Legal projects best suited to changing the legal culture of state
courts must respect the dignity of the litigant, her basic right to equal-
ity, and the significance of the issue of gender-based violence. Women
should have the opportunity to narrate and record their accounts of
abuse and to receive recognition of the harms they have suffered. Le-
gal strategies should seek to elevate domestic violence protection
cases to the same status conferred upon other legal claims by encour-
aging courts to read pleadings, hear evidence, take testimony, evalu-
ate legal arguments, and issue findings of facts and conclusions of
law—and lawyers should always be conscious of the consequences of a
3" See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
318 See Eskridge, supra note 83, at 1084. Eskridge describes the possibilities of
influencing judges and locates them within the spheres of the "interpretive community,"
identified as "legislators, academics, other judges and the parties themselves." The expec-
tations of this community may require judges to act in ways that transcend their personal
biases.
329 See Robin West, The Zealous Advocacy of justice in a Less than Ideal Legal World, 51
STAN. L. REv. 973,988 (1999).
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failure to do so. These strategies should provide opportunities for ju-
dicial education while holding judges accountable for unreasonable
behavior and legal errors. Litigants should provide the court with
sufficient information to facilitate a general understanding about bat-
tered women's circumstances in order to improve the law. Appropri-
ate legal responses should also target prevailing societal attitudes, to
raise public awareness of the policy implications of domestic violence.
Most importantly, all strategies should result in meaningful protection
for battered women.
2. Appellate Law Strategies
Catharine MacKinnon has noted that women seeking relief In
superior forums, disputing male sovereigns by appealing to higher
sovereigns" have had little success. 3" The Morrison decision appears to
confirm her argument. But, the tactics required to move domestic
violence cases out of the margins and to develop a corpus of appellate
law may nonetheless bring about transformative change in the, cul-
ture. Appellate law enhances the significance of the matters it
touches, and may be used to counter the trial courts' view that gen-
der-based violence claims are of lesser value."' Because their obliga-
tions are distinct from those of trial courts, appellate courts are de-
signed to engage in a deliberative and collaborative process that often
requires enhanced judicial competencies. 332 Battered women who
seek appellate review derive authority from higher echelons of a pow-
erful institution in order to secure their rights."
330 MacKinnon, supra note 99, at 176.
331 See Robert A. Carp & Ronald Stidham, Judicial Process in America, 4th ed., CONGRES-
SIONAL QUARTERLY (1998) (noting that an analysis of cases appealed in United States
Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits revealed a shift in the substance
of these cases on appeal where cases considered routine were then given greater political
significance).
"2 Evan Ft Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 817, 848 n.126 (1994) (contrasting courts of appeals that are structurally suited to
a process that promotes accuracy with trial courts whose obligations require them to move
through fast-paced trials). See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as A Means of Error Correc-
tion, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 423 (1995) (suggesting that the appeals process may require
superior judicial skills and that appellate courts are often of higher quality than trial
courts).
3" See Anna-Marie Marshall, Closing the Gaps: Plaintiffs in Pivotal Sexual Harassment
Cases, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 761, 763 (1998) (noting that litigants may borrow govern-
mental power when seeking relief from the courts). This may be particularly true when
litigants seek to obtain court relief in regulating behavior. Id. at 764.
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Appellate pronouncements that establish judicial principles and
ratify legal gravity can serve to dispel the perception that gender-
based violence cases are private problems to be resolved outside of
the courts. Appellate rulings may correct judges who act on biases
and who fail to treat battered women's claims with dignity and re-
spect."4 By affirming legal principles to which lower courts must ad-
here, appellate courts help delineate the boundaries of acceptable
behavior of perpetrators even as they regulate the conduct of trial
courts.335 Appellate decisions act as inducements for trial judges to
consider judicial norms as they are defined by higher courts." 6 judges
conscious of the possibility of reversal are highly likely to consider ap-
pellate precedent when reaching decisions at the trial levels"
An attorney's disinclination to develop the case, which often
leads to the waiver of opening statements or of trial objections, may
be counteracted by having an appellate strategy. When considering
the need to make a record for appeal, attorneys will not forego at-
tempts to make offers of proof or omit an array of evidence demon-
strating the context and nature of the problezn. 338 Appellate strategies
at the trial level demand systematic preparation and full representa-
tion of battered women, including the development of pleadings and
the preparation of a hearing transcript to record the courtroom pro-
ceedings. Such a course demands attention to the usual important
details of a trial: exhibits, legal arguments, trial briefs, and proposed
5" Caminker, supra note 332, at 818 (noting that established legal principles require
courts to follow precedents established by higher courts).
335 Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Prece-
dent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1606 11.1 (1995) (noting that appellate
courts improve the accuracy of prospective trial court decisions). As members of a larger
judicial community, judges are influenced by other court decisions in ways that extend
beyond appellate law doctrine. See Sisk et al., supra note 203, at 1384 (describing the
influences upon judicial consideration of constitutional issues as including the prior rul-
ings of judicial colleagues).
335 See Catherine Stone, Preservation of Error: From Filing the Lawsuit Through Presentation
of Evidence Foreword, 30 ST. MARY'S U. 993, 993 (1999) (asserting that appellate courts
afford trial courts an understanding that their decisions are integrated into the broader
legal system); Note, Sympathy as a Legal Structure, 105 lIARV. L. REV. 1961, 1973 (1992) (de-
scribing how judicial norms are influenced by consideration of how other judges may de-
cide cases).
557 See Note, supra note 336, at 1975 ("The tendency to reach decisions acceptable to
their colleagues is perhaps strongest among those at the bottom of the judicial hierarchy
who generally fear being reversed.").
338 See infra note 365 and accompanying text.
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findings of facts and conclusions of law. 339
 These efforts cannot but
improve policies and practices among attorneys representing battered
women.
4. Appellate Strategies: An Empirical Review
As noted in Part II, significant obstacles prevent battered women
from appealing their cases. 540 Without a developed body of appellate
law in civil domestic violence protection order cases, the degree to
which appellate courts distinguish themselves from current trial court
practice in the handling of these matters is difficult to determine. In
order to assess existent appellate case law for the purposes of this Ar-
ticle, two surveys were undertaken to identify reported appellate deci-
sions resulting from appeals by battered women who were unsuccess-
ful in the trial courts concerning civil orders of protection.Ml Because
of the limited number of appellate cases to draw upon, the potintial
efficacy of undertaking an appellate strategy in the trial courts re-
mains difficult to judge. However, those appellate decisions reviewed
do compare favorably with problematic trial court outcomes and hold
out promise that this may be a useful legal strategy. 342
3" See Fenton, supra note 196, at 1004 (arguing that stories of abuse must be re-
counted in court opinions).
340 See supra notes 274-279 and accompanying text.
341
 Each survey, completed in September 2000, included the fifty states and the District
of Columbia and used a different legal database, each designed to appripach the question
in a different manner. This was done in order to uncover the broadest spectrum of domes-
tic violence civil case law at the appellate level. Different approaches meant that each sur-
vey did not find identical cases, although many overlapped both surveys. It is also not as-
sumed that the two surveys found every appellate case existent at the time. Although the
survey for this Article scrutinized cases appealed by petitioners denied relief at the trial
level, it should be noted that appellate courts considering appeals by batterers against
whom orders of protection had been entered have also resulted in improved outcomes for
battered women. See, e.g., McCoy v. McCoy, 625 N.E.2d 883, 886 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993) (up-
holding the award of custody to the petitioner despite no proof of abuse of the children,
declaring that once one member of the household is abused, the court has maximum dis-
cretionary power to include other members who may be at risk); Blistein v. Blistein, 569
N.E.2d 1357, 1361-62 (III. Ct. App. 1991) (court upheld ancillary relief in a civil protec-
tion order although the husband had not physically abused his wife, noting that threats
and harassment, including pulling a telephone from the wall, demonstrated risk of future
abuse); Coburn v. Coburn, 674 A.2d 951 (Md. 1996) (reviewing extensive legislative his-
tory and purpose of the domestic violence statute and pronouncing that evidence of past
abuse is admissible in order to accomplish preventative purposes of the statute).
342
 Of the approximately 40 reported decisions on appeals by battered women in do-
mestic violence injunction cases reviewed, 75% of them were reversed and/or remanded.
Similarly, a study of appellate decisions in criminal cases where battered women were con-
victed of homicide and other felonies committed against their abusive partners demon-
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a. correcting the Operational Failures
A review of appellate decisions reveals that some state appellate
courts have addressed problems that exist at the trial level, discussed
in Part II of this Article, related to stigmatizing domestic violence
claims as trivial or private disputes. Several appellate courts have
stressed the public importance of these cases, noting their "wide rang-
ing ramifications."343 One appellate court exhorted trial judges "not
to underestimate their ability to influence the respondent's behav-
ior."344 The appellate court's cogent plea to trial judges to "communi-
cate a powerful message about the justice system's view of domestic
violence within their own courtrooms" underscores the political
significance of these cases. 345
Appellate courts have determined that a trial court has a non-
discretionary duty to hear domestic violence matters.TM6 They have
instructed that such proceedings must be full evidentiary hearings,
notwithstanding the crowded court calendars,M 7 and in one case,
criticized a trial judge's efforts to abbreviate the fact-finding proc-
ess. 348 Appellate courts have required fair and neutral application of
the rules of evidence, including consideration of past conduct and
strated positive results for the defendant women. The study revealed a reversal rate of
40%, substantially higher than the national average for criminal appeals. See Maguigan,
supra note 160, at 432-34; see also Martin Barry, supra note 180, at 433, 436 (noting that in
the District of Columbia, the appellate court has "consistently ruled that the domestic
violence statute is remedial and is to be interpreted in favor of those who seek protec-
tion"); cf. Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Courts and the Cultural Performance: Native Hawaiians'
Uncertain Federal and State Law Rights to Sue, 16 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 50 (1994) (noting that
Hawaiian appellate courts held out hope and uncertainty for Native Hawaiian breach of
trust claimants).
343 Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990, 993 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984); see also Harper v.
Harper, 537 So.2d 282 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (noting need to counter social problems cre-
ated by domestic violence); Cesare v. Cesare, 713 A.2d 390, 398 (N.J. 1998) (noting that
domestic violence is a serious problem which historically has not received adequate atten-
tion in the courts).
544 See Felton v. Felton, 679 N.E.2d. 672, 680 (Ohio 1992) (quoting Judge Michael J.
Voris, The Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order and the Role of the Court, 24 AKRON L. Ray.
423,432 (1990)).
345 Id.
348 State ex rel. Marshall v. Hargreaves, 725 P.2d 923 (Or. 1986); see also Conklin v.
Conklin, 586 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 1998) (reversing the trial court for dismissing a civil
protection order hearing when the husband/perpetrator filed a divorce action before the
hearing for a permanent order of protection).
347 See generally Stroll° v. Stroll°, 828 P.2d 532 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Cruz-Foster v. Fos-
ter, 597 A.2(1 927 (D.C. 1991).
348 In reV.C. v. H.C., Sr., 257 A.D.2d 27, 35 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
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previous incidents of abuse. 349
 They have prohibited trial courts from
avoiding domestic violence proceedings by requiring alternative dis-
pute resolution in other venues. 35° One appellate ruling determined
that domestic violence cases are inappropriate for private or out-of-
court resolutions. 351
 Another appellate decision held that the trial
court erred in directing the parties to meet with a court counselor to
discuss the "issues at hand" and declared that the trial court itself was
required to hear testimony and make findings of fact. 352 Similarly, an-
other appellate court ruled that courts themselves—and not private
agencies—are the appropriate decision-makers when custody and visi-
tation issues are raised in the context of domestic violence matters. 353
Appellate courts have confronted the issue of gender bias, and,
in one decision, reprimanded the trial court for rationalizing domes-
tic violence by finding that the husband's admitted acts of abuse were
justified.354
 The court noted that the trial court's actions "raise[d) an
appearance of gender bias" by excusing domestic violence, and it em-
phasized a judge's obligation to perform judicial duties impartially
and to eliminate gender bias from the courtroom. 355 In another case,
an appellate court reversed a trial court for refusing "to even con-
sider" certain relief, as well as for committing clear errors for which
549 See Stroll°, 828 P.2d at 534-35 (reversing a trial court's denial of an order of protec-
tion despite mootness issues where the victim had ultimately obtained an order from a
different judge, noting that a refusal to consider past conduct would impair the prophylac-
tic purpose of the statute); Cesare, 713 A.21:1 at 402 (noting need to consider the history of
abuse in evaluating a domestic violence complaint); Cruz-Foster, 597 A.2d at 930-31 (stress-
ing the importance of the past history in domestic violence cases and requiring considera-
tion of the "entire mosaic").
550 Conklin, 586 N.W.2d 703; Hall v. Hall, 408 N.W.2d 626 (Minn Ct. App. 1987); In re
Kampa v. Kampa, 703 N.Y.S.2d 486 (App. Div. 2000); Strollo, 828 P.2d 532 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992); Felton, 679 N.E.2d at 677.
351
 Sroka v. Sroka, 700 N.E.2d 916, 917 (Ohio Ci App. 1997) (reversing a trial court's
decision denying an order of protection where, although the defendant admitted to as-
saulting the petitioner, the decision nonetheless advised the batterer to "try to control
[himself-I" as a means of resolving the matter).
352
 Mechtel v. Mechtel, 528 N.W.2d 916, 918-19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
555
 Vogt v. Vogt, 455 N.W.2d 471, 475 (Minn. 1990) (noting that it is the "court's job to
decide ... [domestic violence] cases no less than others, and it is important, too, that the
court, not some agency, is perceived by the parties as the decision-maker when it decides").
551
 Huesers v. Huesers, 560 N.W.2d 219, 222 (N.D. 1997) (stating that "domestic vio-
lence is only mitigated when it is committed in self defense," and that "domestic violence
which is provoked by 'button pushing'—in this case die wife bragging about other men
'hitting on her,' and 'skinny-dipping' with another man—is not acceptable and cannot be
weighed against the perpetrator"). (Huesers was an appeal by an abused wife not from a
denial of an order of protection, but rather raised the issue of domestic violence in a di-
vorce action).
355 Id. at 223-24.
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there was "no logical rationale" and which, in effect, punished the
victim of abuse.356 The appellate court specified that a different judge
would be required to hear the matter on remand. This suggests a lack
of confidence in the trial judge and is a way to inform other judges
about the boundaries of appropriate judicial behavior. 357
b. Addressing Bureaucratic Responses
Appellate opinions have also addressed problems associated with
bureaucratic responses to domestic violence clahns. 358 One appellate
court reminded the trial court of its responsibilities to go beyond
form orders to make necessary findings of fact and conclusions of
law. 359 Another appellate decision chastised a trial court for dismissing
a pro se form petition which, although inartfully drawn, pled enough
facts to provide notice. This court observed that pre-hearing dismiss-
als could result in the petitioner's possible injury or even her death. 369
Another appeals court disapproved of the form developed by the state
court administrative offices because it inhibited appropriate consid-
eration of the issues on appeal."'
c. Improving Outcomes for Battered Women
Appellate courts have directed trial courts to construe civil pro-
tection order statutes liberally in order to ensure that intended legis-
lative results are achieved.362 They have reversed trial courts which
granted orders of protection without awarding exclusive use of the
residence to victims, declaring that this practice is both erroneous
and dangerous.363 Other appellate decisions, related to custody and
356 See In re V.C., 257 A.D.2d at 36.
"7 Id.
"8 See notes 244-250 and accompanying text.
359 Price v. Price, 514 S.E.2d 553, 554 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (Price was an appeal
brought by a woman against whom her ex-husband had obtained a protection order after
accusing her of spilling pasta and spices on the floor).
36° Smith v. Smith, 513 N.W.2d 728, 731-32 (Iowa 1994).
391 Brandon v. Brandon, 513 S.E.2d 589, 593 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (Brandon was an ap-
peal by the defendant).
362 See generally Maldonado v. Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40 (D.C. 1993); Merola v. Merola,
536 N.Y.S.2d 842 (App. Div. 1989); Alford v. Garzone, 964 P.2d 944 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998);
Strolls, 828 P. 2d 532; Swenson v, Swenson, 490 N.W.2d 668 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Cruz-
Foster, 597 A.2d 927.
383 In re V.C., 257 A.D.2d at 33-34 (noting that ancillary relief issues in family violence
matters are the "very mandate" of the statute); Merola, 536 N.Y.S.2d 842; see also Swenson,
490 N.W.2d 668.
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visitation, have been instructive, and have required trial courts to
grant custody as part of a domestic violence injunction in order to
assure the safety of victims and their children.364
The potential efficacy of appellate law in domestic violence cases
is revealed by decisions in which trial courts are directed to hold
meaningful hearings, avoid fragmentation of evidence, expand op-
portunities to contextualize domestic violence incidents, and order
comprehensive relief. Further, by requiring the development of
findings of fact and conclusions of law while acknowledging the prac-
tical problems of crowded court calendars, the appellate courts make
an important statement that these cases may not be relegated to a
lesser status where the tasks of adjudication are truncated. The small
body of appellate law in this area indicates that the appellate courts
have accomplished what commentators contemplate of appellate
courts: they have corrected the errors of lower courts.5 Whether they
can achieve a deeper transformation of the legal culture by fulfilling
the appellate court function of improving the prospective outcomes
from such courts remains to be seen.
C. Practical Applications
The use of general legal strategies to create courts that are more
responsive to the needs of battered women depends on the adoption
of specific legal tactics. It entails a case plan that conveys the battered
woman's narrative, obliges a court to hear evidence, and provides
background information in order to contextualize domestic violence
and link it to social issues. A case plan should incorporate tactics that
make a record and preserve the right to appeal, and should contrast
364 See Crippen Jr., v. Crippen, 610 So.2d 686 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (confirming
custody award to battered wife in a domestic violence order despite husband's custody
order from another state); Hall v. Hall, 408 N.W. 626, 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (no error
in imposing supervision of visitation although there was no domestic violence directed
toward children where purpose of such ancillary relief is to minimize risk of additional
problems to petitioner); Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282, 285-86 (Minn. 1992) (comparing
the purpose of custody provisions within domestic violence statutes with custody as part of
marital dissolution statute, and statutes relating primarily to welfare of children and noting
that custody in domestic violence matters is necessary to assure the safety of the victim as
well as the children and does not have to reference standards in dissolution statutes).
365 See Eric J. Magnuson & Michael J. McGuire, Preserving Appellate Issues, 25 FALL-Brief
48 n.3 (1995) (noting that the record on appeal consists of three items: the original papers
and exhibits filed in the district court; the transcript of the proceedings; and a certified
copy of the docket entries prepared by the clerk of district court).
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with the cases marred by disincentives to invest resources as discussed
in Part 11. 366
I. Pleadings and Narrative
Pleadings serve as the means through which battered women
frame their legal claims. A complaint is more than a simple hurdle
that must be overcome to gain access to court. A carefully framed ac-
count offers a judge insight into a battered woman's experiences. It is
a way to give narrative form to a battered woman's story. 367 Pleadings
can recover untold stories and disentangle pernicious stereotypes. 368
They should employ a descriptive device that permits "legal decision
makers [to] recognize both the existence and closeness of the prob-
lem of domestic violence."569
The complaint is often the first opportunity for a judge to engage
the claims of a lawsuit. First impressions created by complaints are
likely to resonate throughout a hearing. Well-drafted complaints can
be critical in motivating judges to develop solutions that better reflect
the dynamics of power in domestic violence and in encouraging
judges to implement the best relief available under statute. Moreover,
narrative pleadings that amplify the facts and circumstances of domes-
tic violence are even more essential where the parties do not engage
in discovery processes. Given limited opportunities for persuasion and
presentation of information, and the reduced fact-finding role played
by trial judges in these matters, the importance of the complaint is
self-evident. 370
As noted in Part II, form pleadings used in domestic violence
cases are indeed useful to battered women who are navigating the
courts pro se. But boilerplate language often prevents the complete
portrayal of women's circumstances and the strategies they often em-
ploy in order to resist and survive. 371 Form pleadings privilege brevity
366 See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
367 See supra note 343 and accompanying text.
363 See Minow, supra note 167, at 821 '(urging scholars, for example, "to look for the
omitted stories of ordinary people, and in particular, the experiences of women, to make
sense of the meanings of social and legal patterns in the lives of people affected by them,
and in turn, creating or resisting them").
366 See Murphy, supra note 87, at 1268.
370 q Eastman, supra note 245. Eastman explores the importance of the initial plead-
ing in a civil rights lawsuit and argues that the important elements of client stories have
been omitted in pleadings but mast and can he re-introduced. Id. at 768.
371 See Delgado, supra note 86, at 2928 (noting that having to state facts in a legal form
sterilizes them); Eastman, supra note 245, at 792 (describing how modern rules of plead-
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over content. Although the forms are designed to facilitate access to
the courts for women appearing pro se, they should not be a device
for preventing battered women from telling their stories. Attorneys
have an obligation to do more.
Attorneys should resist the enervating effects of the legal struc-
ture where a battered woman's story is framed in concise and conclu-
sory legal terms." Narrative form must be given to the story of those
relationships in which men routinely use violence, or the threat of
violence, to dominate women, and particular attention should be paid
to the circumstance of relationships from which women are unable to
extricate themselves. 373
 A careful incorporation of women's narratives
in written form may achieve success in the courts in much the same
fashion as verbal accounts influenced the legislative outcome in
VAWA. 574
Complaints that develop factual accounts and legal theories allow
the story-telling process to unfold and thus help with the process of
judging at both the trial and appellate levels." Complaints, in the
form of legal narrative that describes the experiences of a battered
ings in an effort to eliminate technical pleading requirements excuse "thin" pleadings
when "thick" ones are necessary in order to relate the compelling facts). The forms sug-
gest that little other than checking the boxes is required to support a request for relief
which may then result in a dismissal of the action for insufficient pleadings. See Buda v.
Humble, 517 N.W.2d 622, 625 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994) (dismissing an injunction entered on
insufficient pleadings where the petitioner used preprinted forms and did little more than
check the boxes).
"2
 To the extent that form complaints are required to be used or their non-use is con-
fusing to law enforcement, attorneys can expand the space between the boxes on the form
by attaching longer narratives as supplementary affidavits.
373 See Mahoney, supra note 210, at 1285.
374 See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text; Patricia A. Cain, Good and Bad Bias: A
Comment on Feminist Theory and Judging 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1945, 1953-54 (19) (contrasting
two abortion cases, Roe ts Wade and Thornburgh u American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists). Cain states that in the former, there were no stories of women who needed abor-
tions or the accounts of unwanted pregnancies and suggests that as a result, the decision in
Roe focuses on the medical issues while excluding the realities faced by women in need of
abortions. In contrast, in Thornburgh, the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Ac-
tion League (NARAL) strategically decided to use the briefs as an opportunity to describe
first-person accounts of the women desperate for abortions. Cain suggests that by includ-
ing these stories which detailed the pain and grief of women who could not access safe and
legal abortions, the resulting Supreme Court decision reflects the stories of women who
suffered unwanted pregnancies. Id. at 1953-54.
373
 Cain, supra note 374, at 1953 (noting that by developing the use of story telling, the
judging process is improved). See also Kirk Heilbrun, Prediction Versus Management Models
Relevant to Risk Assessment: The Importance of Legal Decision-Making Context, 21 LAW AND HU-
MAN BEHAVIOR 347, 349 (1997) (stating that "Mit theory, at least the quality of the infor-
mation provided to a decision-maker should affect the quality of the decision").
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woman and her efforts to escape the abuser's control, should also be
made a part of the record.376 Complaints thus provide a vehicle for
describing the consequences of domestic violence and presenting
possible solutions to both trial and appellate courts.
2. Offers of Proof, Narrative, and Evidentiary Hearings
In domestic violence cases, offers of proof require the court to
hear what it may wish to avoid." 7 A trial tactic designed to encourage
judges to allow evidence and to preserve the record, offers of proof
can be accomplished in a variety of ways. These include a narrative
presentation by the attorney, a series of questions and answers with
the witness, or a written offer in the form of a memorandum." Be-
cause offers must be stated with specificity, the preferred procedure
may be to question the battered woman in court. 879 Proffering the live
testimony of the battered woman not only eliminates any question as
to the content of the proposed evidence, but it also gives the trial
court an opportunity to hear the full story. The opportunity to intro-
duce narrative in the form of an offer of proof may enable a judge to
understand the dynamic and circumstances of domestic violence, and
thus motivate him or her to allow the evidence.
Offers of proof counter a judge's predilection to hurry through
with domestic violence cases. An offer of proof made in accordance
with the appropriate rules may not be easily refused without the court
committing reversible error. 38° Attorneys who are unsuccessful in pre-
venting judges from unfairly compressing the time allotted to these
cases through offers of proof assure an arguable appellate point. Ei-
379 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 88, at 139 (noting the intimate and essential link
between narrative and the law).
3" In order to preserve a ruling excluding evidence as error for review, the substance
of the evidence must he known by an offer of proof unless otherwise apparent from the
context. See generally FED. R. Evm. 103(a) & (b).
379 Magnuson & McGuire, supra note 365, at 49.
379 Thomas A. Demetrio, Dial Practice, 14-JUN GRA Rec. 58, 59 (2000).
38° See Deinetrio, supra note 379, at 60 (failure to make offer of proof excused where
trial judge is hostile and refused to allow counsel to make offer of proof); Polly Jessica
Estes, Preservation of Error: From Filing Lawsuit Through Presentation of Evidence, 30 ST. MARY'S
L. J. 997, 1085 (1999) (asserting that it is error for a judge to refuse to allow an attorney to
make an offer of proof); Lewis Rapier, Offers of Proof, 21 Fast. L. Q. 265, 269 (1987) (not-
ing that it may be error for a judge to refuse an offer of proof if made in the correct fash-
ion and in good faith); Judge Lawrence W. Pierce, Appellate Advocacy: Some Reflections from
the Bench, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 829, 835 (1993) (noting that where an attorney insists on
making an offer of proof, and it is rejected, the issue may be preserved for appellate pur-
poses).
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ther alternative may assist in reconciling a judge to the fact that these
cases are entitled to evidentiary hearings and to be treated like other
legal claims. Offers of proof provide attorneys a way to expand their
case presentation by preparing documentary evidence.
It must be noted that offers of proof in domestic violence cases
tried without juries are awkward. 381 The judge deciding whether the
evidence should be admitted hears that evidence at the same time.
Avoiding the prejudicial effect of improper evidence is a legitimate
concern and must be addressed through reliance upon both the ethi-
cal and professional responsibilities of attorneys and the discretion of
judges. However, as this Article suggests, the problem with the intro-
duction of evidence in civil domestic violence proceedings lies more
with judges who resist the adjudication than with attorneys who at-
tempt to introduce improper evidence.
3. Social Science Research382
Courts have relied on social science research in cases in which
new law is created, existing law is modified, or where statutes are in-
terpreted. 383
 Social science research, a description of reality derived
from empirical data, assists judges in the exercise of discretion.'" Its
findings can provide principles that are relevant to situations that ex-
tend beyond a particular investigation. 383
 In domestic violence cases,
the introduction of social science research often provides context and
comprehensibility in sorting through the facts of a specific case. 388
381 See Kapner, supra note 380, at 269.
382
 For an excellent overview of evidentiary concerns in domestic violence cases, see
generally Jane H. Aiken & Jane C. Murphy, Evidence Issues in Domestic Violence Civil Cases, 34
FAM. L.Q. 43 (2000).
382 See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Science Research in Law—A New Para-
digm, in LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY (Martin Lyon Levine ed., 1995); see also Ellie Margolis,
Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in Appellate Briefs, 34 U.S.F. L. Ray.
197, 198 (2000) (pointing,out that in deciding what the law ought to be, judges must look
beyond cases, statutes, rules and regulations). Margolis notes that cases, including those
that require statutory interpretation, often involve policy decisions that are improved when
social science research is submitted. Id. at 219.
384
 See Margolis, supra note 383, at 198.
385 See Monahan & Walker, supra note 383, at 5 (comparing the similarities between so-
cial science research and the law in their abilities to arrive at principles and conclusions
that are applicable beyond a particular situation).
388 See Aiken & Murphy, supra note 382, at 46 (noting that lawyers may offer clinically
based testimony about domestic violence that assesses relationships and opines about the
effects of violence in a particular case, but they often overlook social framework testimony
which "pulls] clinical data in perspective" and '`clarifies the contradictions and misconcep-
tions regarding domestic abuse").
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The introduction of sociological evidence has proven to be instruc-
tive.387
Empirical evidence that facilitates an understanding of domestic
violence and aids in the resolution of factual disputes should be ad-
missible through an expert or in the form of journal articles and text
excerpts. 388 Social science research may also be introduced in the
form of "Brandeis briefs,”389 which includes legislative factual evi-
dence. 39° These briefs may be presented to the trial judge or to an ap-
pellate court."'
In domestic violence cases lacking fully developed factual rec-
ords, briefs containing sociological materials can instruct a court on
the broader implications of a ruling. This may be persuasive in obtain-
ing a particular decision to benefit the litigant and in achieving a pol-
icy outcome that advances the interests of battered women in general.
Research that sheds light on the impact of domestic violence on the
economic stability of battered women, or on the circumstances of
their homelessness, or on the physical and psychological devastation
387 SeeJudge Cindy S. Lederman & Neena M. Malik, Family Violence: A Report on the State
of the Research, 73-DEC. FLA. Bj 58, 59 (1999) (encouraging the introduction of social sci-
ence research into domestic violence claims); Jackson, supra note 266, at 8 (1993) (citing
Kenneth L. Kant and noting that in some matters, "courts need 'to be informed on mat-
ten far beyond the facts of the particular case"). Several reported appellate decisions with
favorable outcomes for battered women discussed in this Part rely extensively on social
science research. See, e.g., Felton, 679 N.E,2d 672; Bake; 494 N.W.2d 282; Cesare, 713 A.2d
390; Coburn, 674 A.2d 951; Marquette, 686 P.2d. 990.
3" Aiken & Murphy, supra note 382, at 47, 52 n.43. As the authors note, learned trea-
tise evidence is introduced upon an expert's opinion that it is authoritative, or by judicial
notice.
3" A "Brandeis brief" is a legal document named for a brief submitted by Louis D.
Brandeis in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 912 (1908) in which he introduced all of the existing
social science research relevant to the issue of the length of working hours and women's
health. Margolis, supra note 383, at 199 n.12. These briefs are generally introduced at the
appellate level and provide evidence in the form of statistical data and surveys, reports of
public investigative committees, or scientific discussion by experts. Jackson, supra note 266,
at 2 n.6 (citing BLACK'S Law DICTIONARY).
3" Legislative facts are those which "'inform a court's legislative judgment on ques-
tions of law and policy'" and "help the tribunal to determine the content of law and policy
and to exercise its judgment or discretion in determining what course of action to take.'"
Margolis, supra note 383, at 198-99 (citing Kenneth Culp Davis).
391 See Jackson, supra note 266, at 2-3 (suggesting that the trial court is the superior
court for the introduction of legislative or general facts that do not concern the immediate
parties and that by introducing legislative facts at the trial level, there is a greater opportu-
nity for controlling fact-finding at the appellate level); Margolis, supra note 383, at 203-05
(noting that there are no prohibitions or procedural bars for the introduction of non-legal
materials or the citing of factual information in support of appellate arguments even when •
it has not been introduced at the trial level).
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visited upon their children, enables judges to understand the benefits
of issuing orders with terms that touch a wide range of conditions af-
fecting victims of domestic violence.392
The legislative and judicial process in VAWA enhanced the use-
fulness of social science research in domestic violence claims. A vast
corpus of testimony and research was submitted during the legislative
hearings and adopted as congressional findings. The Supreme Court,
while disagreeing with the constitutional significance of the findings,
did not disturb their substance. 393
 The comprehensive record of evi-
dence created in the course of VAWA's passage remains useful in state
court civil proceedings.
4. Concern for Methodology
The legal strategy chosen to achieve legal relief for battered
women should not, as Katharine Bartlett warned, "recreate the ille-
gitimate power structures [that they are] trying to identify and un-
dermine."394 At first glance, the use of expanded legal tactics or of
appellate practices, both of which require time and resources, may
appear to be limited to women who are not only represented by at-
torneys, but whose representation will extend beyond the trial level.
The implementation of formal and rigorous legal practices at the trial
level is difficult, if not impossible, for the many women who appear
pro se. Standards that imply increased trial preparation, enhanced
development of evidence, and the submission of briefs may discour-
age those pro bono attorneys who seek to limit their representation,
or may otherwise make representation too costly for them to under-
take.
Battered women who represent themselves pro se have little al-
ternative other than to use the boxes on a complaint form. At present,
392 See Margolis, supra note 383, at 213 (noting that this type of evidence is defined as
having the ability to demonstrate the general effect of a legal rule in order to encourage a
judge to make a particular rule). The possible misuse of social science research, however,
also looms as a potential danger to battered women, Empirical data and studies may be
mischaracterized and some social science data may be inherently flawed and unreliable. See
Margolis, supra note 383, at 232-33. Thus, attorneys are required to be diligent in the use
of empirical information and to develop interdisciplinary insights to assist them in identi-
fying valid research findings to support battered women's claims and refute the manipula-
tion of data or the introduction of unreliable findings.
393 See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
394 Bartlett, supra note 228, at 831. See also Katharine T. Bartlett, Cracking Foundations as
Feminist Method, 8 Am. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 31, 32 (1999) (noting that methodo-
logical issues are critical to feminist legal theory).
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they may be obliged to curtail their stories in exchange for easier ac-
cess to the court. Attorneys who represent battered women, however,
should be expected to uncover opportunities to provide the kind of
representation that can change the legal culture and improve out-
comes. Attorneys who regularly represent battered women often have
a working relationship with domestic violence programs, and their
heightened appreciation of the devastation of domestic violence may
create the incentive to employ legal strategies aimed at transforming
court processes. Other attorneys who represent battered women
should do no less than guarantee the comprehensive representation
that they would provide in any other type of case they handle. The
benefits of legal strategies implemented in one case may have far-
reaching consequences. Attorneys who educate trial judges during an
individual case, or obtain a favorable appellate decision, improve the
process for all women, whether pro se or represented by counsel.
D. Other Strategies
Legal strategies employed at the individual case level are not the
only choices available to battered women who seek a more responsive
legal system. Judicial education, courtwatch programs, class-action
litigation on related issues, amicus briefs, media coverage, and suc-
cessful lobbying for legislative changes may also influence judges who
would otherwise prefer to push these matters aside. Heightened pub-
lic attention to judicial animosity toward domestic violence matters
has been shown to improve outcomes in civil protection order
cases."5 Media attention has also had a significant impact on the be-
havior ofjudges."5
Class actions may garner the collective support of countless
women affected by a government agency's misinformed and punitive
practice while remediating those practices in federal court. A recent
federal class action lawsuit filed on behalf of battered women with
children challenged the New York City child welfare agency's practice
of removing children from homes in which domestic violence was
present. 357 This action challenged institutional responses to domestic
3" See PTACEK, supra note 160, at 56 (noting that the public spotlight on judicial hostil-
ity created pressure for official responses and achieved some changes),
n Id, at 60, 61 (demonstrating that judges hear public humiliation in the media and
media attention impacts the manner in which domestic violence cases are treated).
197 Nicholson et al. v. Williams et al., No. 00—CV-2229 (E.D.N.Y. filed June 15, 2000).
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violence in which battered women are treated as though they are re-
sponsible for the violence they suffered.
Amicus briefs filed in high-profile lawsuits, and in other cases
relevant to the legal claims of battered women, may serve to unite the
movement to end gender-based violence by helping to reveal to courts
the widespread support for proper legal treatment of domestic vio-
lence issues. Elizabeth Schneider and others, for example, were in-
strumental in writing and organizing amicus support on critical do-
mestic violence legal issues in Hedda Nussbaum's litigation against
Joel Steinberg.398 The strategies outlined above may have the effect of
elevating domestic violence claims to the same status as civil rights
issues, worthy of the court's time and attention. They bring together
the shared wisdom and collective strength of women who have en-
dured and resisted domestic violence in the pursuit of change.
Finally, legislative changes may be appropriate to the extent that
poor outcomes for battered women in the courts are sometimes a re-
sult of poor or absent statutes. Legislators should regularly review civil
protection order statutes to determine the adequacy of their provi-
sions.599 For example, state statutes should mandate that custody de-
terminations in domestic violence proceedings must be determined
in accordance with the safety needs of women and children. They
should clarify that the traditional standards for evaluating custody and
visitation in custody and divorce matters, i.e., "the best interest of the
child" and the "rights of the children to access to both parents," must
be applied in the context of domestic violence statutes, which have
the goal of keeping victims safe from further acts of violence.'m Stat-
utes should also be amended to clarify the need for, and encourage
the provision of, financial support to address the economic costs of
separation and stabilization for a battered woman and her children.4m
3" See Amicus Brief, Nussbaum v. Steinberg; (arguing for a tolling of New York's statute of
limitations in tort actions where the consequences of domestic violence incapacitate a
litigant, preventing her from filing her claims in accordance with the statute of limita-
tions). Several reported appellate decisions favorable to battered women discussed supra in
this Part were supported by amicus briefs. See, e.g., Felton, 679 N.E.2d 672; Vogt, 455 N.W. 2d
471; Baker; 494 N.W.2d 282; In re VC., 257 A.D.2d 27.
399 Barbara Hart, Draft Recommendations to the Department ofJustice: Civil Protection Orders,
July 3, 2000 (on file with author) (noting that in 1999, 33 state legislatures supplemented
their domestic violence codes).
4°° Id.
401 Id.
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Legislative efforts to reinstate a civil rights remedy either on the fed-
eral or state level should be considered. 402
Legislative mandates will always be dependent on the contextual
understandings of judges who interpret and implement them. 403 The
difficulties battered women face are more the result of the misapplica-
tion of the law than of the content of the law itself. 4" Because statu-
tory law is largely satisfactory, these problems are not likely to be
solved by statutory changes. 405 While judicially-created law has, to
some extent, been relied upon to promote social change (although
successes customarily experience counteraction from the existing so-
cial order), it is the judicial system and not the legislative system that
presents the greatest resistance to challenging gender-based vio-
lence.906 Certainly this is one lesson to be drawn from VAWA's legisla-
tive enactment and its subsequent judicial demise. Thus, an enhanced
understanding of the failure in the courts, together with strategies to
improve judicial outcomes for battered women, may provide the
greatest hope for combating gender-based violence.
CONCLUSION
Any issue is considered and framed in accordance with the social,
cultural and political influences that exist at any particular moment in
history.407 The passage of VAWA and the court struggle for its imple-
mentation are part of the process of framing issues surrounding vio-
lence against women. Legislation and litigation act together to foster
a new environment which gives impetus to changes. VAWA reflects a
process of lengthy public debate that produced a recognition of the
structural causes and consequences of gender-based violence and
brought the issue to a national forum. United States v. Morrison is a re-
902 See Goldscheid, SUPM note 43, at 136 (discussing several approaches on the federal
level which might address the concerns in Morrison in order to reinstate VAWA). In addi-
tion, the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund has proposed that states pass state civil
rights remedies and has released a model version. (On file with the author).
455 See Maguigan, supra note 159, at 404-05 (criticizing proposals for statutory changes
to self-defense statutes as a panacea for difficulties faced by battered women defendants in
the courts). See also Susser, supra note 159, at 19.
Maguigan, supra note 159, at 432.
905 Id. at 437.
400 See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Social Construction of Brown v. Board of
Education: Law Reform and the Reconstructive Paradox, 36 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 547, 551
(1995).
407 GoRD - - - tUN supra note 89, at 3 (asserting that family violence is "historically and po-
litically constructed," according to the political climate and the strength of forces in oppo-
sition).
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minder that the courts defend the status quo. It confirms that the ju-
diciary often avoids issues that challenge dominant paradigms, which
are then defended by invoking a myriad of obtuse legal conventions
"that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain
persons and groups at the expense of others. "`1°a
"Individual women," as James Ptacek observed, "are assaulted by
individual men, but the ability of so many men to repeatedly assault,
terrorize, and control so many women draws on institutional collusion
and gender inequality."909
 This collusion takes many forms, but it is
particularly striking in its manifestation as diminished opportunity for
examination of gender-based violence issues by the courts. Limita-
tions in domestic violence hearings prevent the development of the
entire story of this problem, and the results of .this are dismal: Facts
are omitted, sequences are interrupted, and consequences are ig-
nored. Neither the specific abusive behaviors, nor the problematic
social relationships which give rise to them, are successfully regulated.
Battered women generally obtain no relief, and they gain no re-
sources, either rhetorical or precedentia1.41 ° Individual rights are not
adjudicated, and public values are not articulated.
The unwillingness of the courts to intervene serves to legitimize
domestic violence.411
 Battered women are denied both their safety
and their opportunity to generate social change through the litigation
process in which courts reflect and affect public values. These conse-
quences of the law's destructive engagement with the issue of domes-
tic violence require continued efforts to improve the likelihood that
courts will be responsive to the interests of battered women. In the
end, battered women need the courts to act, to decide, to regulate,
and to improve the conditions of their real world lives. 412 Reliance on
the law to restructure social relationships or transform social realities
may create unrealistic expectations. 415
 But when a battered woman
4°8
 SeeYamamoto, supra note 14, at 850.
40° PTAGEK, supra note 160, at 9.
41° See Lucie White, Goldberg v. Kelly: On The Paradox of Lauryering for the Poor; 56 Bitoolt.
L. REV. 861, 871 (1990) (noting that lawsuits contribute to improving conditions by provid-
ing a rhetorical resource for subordinated groups).
411 See PTACEK, supra note 160, at 11 (noting that a key element of state power is the
courts which, through their inaction, legitimate violence).
41R See Eskridge, supra note 191, at 708 (noting that "law's legitimacy must depend on
substantive justice and not procedural correctness").
413 See Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African Ameri-
can Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477, 479 (1998) (acknowledging the dangers in some legal
remedies, e.g., reparations, as "leaving undisturbed attendant social realities").
2001]	 Gender-based Violence as Judicial Anomaly 	 1159
can get a protection order that gives her exclusive use of the home,
custody of her children, child support, and the sole set of keys to the
family car, the relief is real and immediate and there is little danger of
misplaced confidence in the legal system. When her abuse is recog-
nized in national and state forums as a civil right violation for which
she is entitled to compensation, she experiences at least a partial vin-
dication. This type of relief is not illusory or merely symbolic. It pro-
vides women with the resources they need to make independent
choices about their lives and safety, and gradually transforms the legal
culture, with an attendant change in public values and concerns.
